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ABSTRACT
Much of recent scholarship on the nones and the spiritual but not religious attempts to
understand them through the concept of authority. Often scholars argue that authority has left
traditional American religious institutions and that the nones are self-authorized in terms of
religion. Scholars often make these claims without considering what self-authorization means.
This thesis shows that attributing authority to the self is problematic and aims to provide another
lens through which to view the nones. The better approach is to view the nones as experts rather
than authorities. Thus, this thesis argues that the nones are religious experts. Furthermore, the
thesis argues that the nones have a claim to religious expertise equal to that of institutional
religious experts.
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THE RELIGIOUS NONES

We live in a world where many are beginning to disaffiliate with traditional religious
institutions in favor of their own spiritual seeking. Groups such as the religious nones and the
spiritual but not religious (who will be referred to in this study synonymously) are examples of
these unaffiliated. Further, this phenomenon is deemed as acceptable and is quickly becoming
normal to many of us today. This, as Charles Taylor points out, was not always the case and this
shifting religious landscape is a rather recent historical development.1 Five hundred years ago, it
was all but unthinkable to reject the authority of religious institutions, whereas now it is all but
unthinkable to accept it. Many have joined Taylor in asking what has caused this shift and have
surveyed historical events leading up to the present moment. Others have decided that this rapid
growth can be totally attributed to forces outside religion such as politics or new social norms.
Rarely, however, do such theories look to the hearts of the nones themselves.
Why are so many people empowering themselves to leave their religious institutions to
explore spirituality on their own? This is at the heart of what many are asking when they theorize
about the unaffiliated. But this is not the most important question. As sociologist Nancy
Ammerman points out, “[P]eople have probably always been religious in many ways that would
have made their official religious leaders uncomfortable.”2 The more relevant question is how
people are empowering themselves in a spiritual sense. Furthermore, we must ask why society
deems this exodus normal or acceptable. The answer to these questions lies at the heart of the
current religious landscape and it must be answered if we would like to understand it.
1

Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Boston: Belknap Press, 2007).

2

Nancy Ammerman, Sacred Stories, Spiritual Tribes: Finding Religion in Everyday Life
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 6.
1

We will see from a variety of sources that “self-empowerment” is central to the identity
of the nones. While many claim that the nones leave religion on the basis of some sort of selfempowerment, few have taken this idea seriously. How would our view of the nones change if
we explored what it means to be self-empowered in terms of religion? In order to answer this
question, this thesis will look at the identity of the nones in relation to recent scholarship on
authority and expertise. While it might seem oxymoronic to view the unaffiliated in this way, we
miss the crucial ways in which they empower themselves and how we empower them if we do
not do so. If we neglect the role authority and expertise play in the religiosity of the nones, we
miss something critical. If we look at views of the nones and our views of them, we can come to
a fuller understanding of this group that is becoming so prominent.

The Empirical Nones
In order to study the religious nones, one must first attempt to define what this label
means. Accordingly, we will begin by putting the definition in its broadest possible terms: the
religious nones are a group. While this definition is frustratingly broad, it is all that one can
immediately claim about this group without getting into sticky situations. Indeed, even this
extremely broad definition is risky to claim because of the connotation behind the word “group.”
A group is typically understood as a collection of people who have a similar trait, and this trait is
what allows them to be ordered or classed together. This similar trait often affects some aspect of
the collective’s life. To use a religious example, sociologists can expect that Evangelical
Christians will adhere to certain customs, behave in certain ways, and even vote for particular
parties while correlating this with their religious affiliation. This is often what we find: that the
majority of those who identify with a certain group are in fact similar to one another in certain
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respects and do behave in ways similar to each other in given situations based on their defining
trait. This all stems from the fact that the group’s traits typically form a part of their identity.
Within the realm of social science, the nones, while still being considered a group, do not have
this shared form of identity outside of the way they answer a simple question on a survey.
The way in which surveyors identify the nones is based on their answers to polls about
religious affiliation. When people indicate that they do not affiliate with any of the given
religious options they are then labeled as a none. This is the common identity forming link that
social science gives us for the nones as a group. While this is not much, it allows us to see that
the nones are defined, at least by surveyors, by their lack of religious affiliations. Even though
their “affiliation” is that they do not affiliate with any of the given religions, the way in which we
identify the nones revolves around their religious preferences. From this starting point it would
be correct to expand on our previous definition by claiming that the religious nones are a
religious group. Where other religious groups on surveys have general tendencies (the majority
of those who identify as mainline protestants are older) there are hardly any patterns with the
nones. If we were to look for any correlations between the nones and certain demographics we
would find very little helpful information. The only demographic variables that could be
associated with the nones (age, race, political ideology, etc.) show no general pattern as far as
who is identifying as one of the unaffiliated. Ryan Burge illustrates this by writing,

It’s nearly impossible to give a simple description of who the nones are: they exist
in large numbers in age, income, and educational spectrums. They now reflect the
racial diversity of Americans as a whole and are more gender diverse than ever
before. And while many people assume that the religiously unaffiliated are far-left
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political liberals who favor the democratic party, that’s become less and less true
every election cycle.3
Burge argues that the full spectrum of those who identify as nones cannot be captured by
demographic data. As soon as we claim that the nones are, for example, mostly well-educated
white men, we have to acknowledge that a significant number of nones are not part of this
demographic. Trying to make definitive claims by splitting the nones up into demographic
subgroups, then, cannot reflect the group as a whole. Thus, defining the nones based on
demographic or political data is not possible.
It is equally unproductive to attempt to define the nones in terms of belief. Nones do not
all believe the same things. Not all nones are aggressive atheists or aloof agnostics. In fact, many
nones still claim to believe in some higher power but posit that this power is different from the
God we find in American institutional religion. Linda Mercadante discusses this theme over the
course of her interviews with nones writing, “I learned I could not assume that when they spoke
of the ‘sacred,’ a transcendent reality, a divine dimension, or even use the word ‘God,’ that they
meant a ‘personal’ God.”4 The nones do often affirm that there is something out there, but they
are extremely diverse in terms of what this “something” is. While some nones do believe in a
transcendent personal God, others simply acknowledge something like an immanent universal
will. These beliefs, and everything that could possibly fit in between, are displayed by the nones.
This is another example of the extreme internal diversity of this group. A diversity that makes it
impossible to define the nones based on strictly empirical findings.

3

Ryan Burge, The Nones: Where They Came From, Who They Are, and Where They Are
Going (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2021), 70.
Linda A. Mercadante, Belief Without Borders: Inside the Minds of the Spiritual but not
Religious (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 93.
4
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It is interesting, then, that scholars who are theorizing why the nones are rising so
quickly often point to data dealing with political ideology to make their arguments. While
scholars point to all kinds of demographic data to come to conclusions, by far the most common
argument made by these theorists has to do with the assumption that all nones are a reaction to
conservative politics. Even Burge acknowledges this. The basic argument goes something like
this: Conservative politics has invaded religion in America and the nones are a reaction to this.
Many of the scholars who subscribe to this idea argue that “the primary reason for the growing
number of persons leaving religious practice, especially the young, is the identification of
religion with conservative politics.”5 But as we saw earlier, the nones are less and less of a
political monolith with every election cycle. Furthermore, to claim that the nones are only a
reaction to conservative politics mistakenly attributes something political to our foundational
definition. On this reading, the nones are a political group. This definition undermines the
religiosity of the nones and in a sense rejects their religious preferences. Rather than responding
to religious phenomena, these thinkers believe the nones are simply responding to political
phenomena. This, in essence, is what those who subscribe to this theory claim. And while there
may be large numbers of nones who are political motivated, to claim that the group as a whole is,
again, does not account for a significant portion of the group and does not reflect the data that
has been collected. This theory, then, cannot account for all the nones and is thus inadequate
when trying to explain their growth.
In a counterintuitive way, demographic and political data actually point to the fact that
they cannot be used properly to come to an adequate definition of the nones. To attempt to define

5

George Heron, “‘None’: The Changing Religious Landscape in the United
States,” Torch (Fall 2015): 23.

5

the nones by any of the demographic metrics found by the social sciences comes up short
because it cannot account for them all. The nones are too diverse. Indeed, scholars have even
noticed this internal diversity and have labeled the further subgroups. These categories consist of
atheists, agnostics, and what some call NIP’s (or “nothing in particulars”). These NIP’s make up
the overwhelming majority of the none category while atheists and agnostics are minorities
under the label.6 While the first two categories correspond to standard religious labels (atheist
and agnostic), the NIP’s are much more varied and harder to pin down. The NIP category is also
further split up into subcategories because many scholars have noticed NIP’s shifting allegiances
between religious institutions. It is not uncommon for a significant number of NIP’s to shift
religious identities from survey to survey. This is what prompts scholars such as Lim,
MacGregor, and Putnam, to state, “Just as many political independents are actually leaners, we
argue that many religious nones are actually liminal somethings, who still hold a weak sense of
attachment to a religious tradition and thus may identify with the tradition sometimes, if not
always.”7 Their study shows that many of the NIP’s can be labeled as either liminal or stable in
that significant portions of this subgroup have labeled themselves as nones at one point, but still
label themselves in typical religious categories at another. As these studies show, the religious
nones are very difficult to define based solely on demographic data. These findings do, however,
contribute something to our definition. We can accurately claim that the nones are an internally
diverse religious group.

6

Burge, The Nones, 30-31.

7

Chaeyoon Lim, Carol Ann MacGregor, and Robert D. Putnam, “Secular and Liminal:
Discovering Heterogeneity Among Religious Nones,” Journal for the Scientific Study of
Religion 49, no. 4 (December 2010): 597.
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We have established that social survey research can only take us so far in defining the
nones because of their internal diversity. This, however, is not entirely accurate. There is one
more metric that social science definitively gives to a definition of the nones. This would be that
the nones are an internally diverse religious group that is growing rapidly. The nones are one of
the fastest growing religious groups in America and the western world. One scholar states that
the rise of the nones is the most important religious phenomenon in modern times, arguing that
within decades identifying with “no religion” will overtake identifying as a Christian in the UK.8
This development is unprecedented in the history of the west. In America as well they are one of
the fastest developing “religious” groups. George Heron observes,

In the 1930s and 1940s, the number of unaffiliated in America hovered around
5%. The number rose to 8% in the 1990s and is presently at 20% of the
population, or over 50 million people. To give you some perspective, that number
is greater than the total number of American Methodists, Lutherans, Pentecostals,
Presbyterians, Jews, Episcopalians, Mormons and Muslims combined.9

From this we can see that in America as well the Religious Nones are on track to becoming the
dominant religious label of individuals.
So, from looking only to survey data, we come away with a definition that argues the
nones are an internally diverse religious group that is growing rapidly. While this does get us
away from the frustratingly simple definition we began with, there is still much we do not know
about the nones. This data, while useful, does not get us anywhere when trying to define who the
nones are or what a none is. If the nones are indeed a religious group, religiosity must be taken
8

Linda Woodhead, “Intensified Religious Pluralism and De-Differentiation: The British
Example,” Society 53, no. 1 (February 2016): 42.
9

Heron, “‘None’: The Changing Religious Landscape in the United States,” 17–24.
7

account of in their definition. But this definition, as we have seen, cannot answer the complex
questions related to the nones’ spiritual or religious lives. In short, the empirical social sciences
give us an incomplete picture of who the nones are. Furthermore, survey data cannot be a basis
for a theory concerning the religious identity of nones because the discipline can only tell us
what the nones are answering on surveys. In order to expand our basic definition and come up
with an adequate theory for the rise of the nones, we must expand our scope. To further
understand and define the nones, I propose, we must be open to looking to social theory.

Authority, the Nones, and Social Theory
Because data on the nones points beyond its ability to fully encapsulate them, this thesis
argues that the nones are better understood when utilizing social theory along with survey data. It
is primarily through this lens that we can continue to add useful frameworks to our foundational
definition. Where many studies of the nones take the form of survey reports, ethnographies, or
histories, there is no major study that looks at the religiously unaffiliated through the lens of
theories of authority or expertise. If they are analyzed theoretically at all, it is typically done so
from the perspectives of secularization or pluralism. These studies, however, focus only on
subtractive elements, what the nones take away from religion, and neglect the additive. This
study will attempt to emphasize the often-ignored positive features of the nones’ religious
identity by engaging them theoretically. If our purpose is to view the nones in terms of theories
surrounding authority and expertise, we could argue that an appropriate place to start such an
analysis would be the fact that the nones are a religious group. The way in which some religious
groups have been understood theoretically are as structures of power and authority. This is true

8

not only for the first social theorists but remains true up through recent scholarship.10 If the
nones, then, are a religious group, it would make sense that we can view them through the lens of
authority as the tradition of social theory demands. By doing so we will see that authority plays
an integral role in the definition of a none.
The role of authority in society is hardly a new concept within the realm of social theory.
From the foundations of the discipline of sociology, theorists such as Durkheim, Weber, and
Tocqueville, among others, were observing and writing of the ways in which authority plays a
dominant role in the social order and how it functions. Authority, as seen by these social
theorists, was a glue that held society together. Even now authority is a relevant topic among
social theorists, even though the emphasis on authority is quite different.11 To further apply the
concept of authority to religion is, again, hardly a new idea. The foundational theorists
mentioned above often wrote of the ways in which authority functioned within religions or the
way in which external authorities impinged on religious communities. Weber’s notion of
charisma and Marx’s definition of religion both acknowledge the role of authority. In short, the
relationship between religion and authority is certainly noticed in the realm of sociology. All
religions, indeed, are constructed in authority, and nearly every religious tradition has been
examined in terms of authority as laid out in the disciplines of social theory or religious studies.
There are, however, some nontraditional religious groups that have not been examined in terms

10

Stephen S. Bush, Visions of Religion: Experience, Meaning, and Power (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2014).
11

Contemporary discussions of authority are often centered around power as a product of
what many now call “the material turn” in the humanities and social sciences. See Susanne
Lettow, “Turning the Turn: New Materialism, Historical Materialism and Critical Theory,”
Thesis Eleven 140, no. 1 (June 2017): 106-21.
9

of the way in which authority functions within them. The religious nones are one of these groups
and an analysis of authority within this group is pertinent if we want to understand them.
As is the case with every religious group, to speak of the religious nones is, in part, to
speak of authority. Yet, unlike other religious communities, to speak of the religious nones is to
speak of a seeming absence of authority. To define oneself in opposition to traditional religious
bodies, as the religious nones do,12 is to make a claim about the authority of these institutions. To
claim that one’s own autonomy as a “spiritual seeker” is more important than any institutional
guidance is an assault on the authority of these institutions. The label itself is a challenge to
authoritative bodies. From this we glean another definitional aspect of the nones. Along with all
the previous attributes we can now add that the nones are a religious group that is indifferent to
external religious authority. Much in the same way a political revolution would begin with
people shirking the authority of their government, a shifting religious temperament begins with
congregants dodging the authority of their institutions and leaving their churches.
This loss of authority is even measurable, some sociologists argue, pointing to the survey
data collected about the nones. Declining church attendance, among many other symptoms, is
something scholars point to in order to identify this deterioration. There are, however, those who
see the nones as spiritual. These people might also examine the ways in which some
denominations have held on to numbers despite others failing, as a means to combat the idea of
overall religious decline; but these criticisms do not get the whole picture. While the claims of
secularization theory are seen by some to be falling out of style as religion around the world

12

Robert C. Fuller, Spiritual but not Religious (New York: Oxford University Press,

2001), 6.
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continues to have a major influence,13 scholars such as Mark Chaves argue that this only seems
the case because the researchers are focusing on religion in terms of numbers rather than
religious authority.14 While religions globally might be growing or sustaining themselves, there
is something now missing from the religious landscape in the West. It might not be
secularization in its most explicit sense, but, as we learn from Taylor, something has indeed
changed. We could account for this change, Chaves argues, if researchers were to look at
secularization as declining religious authority rather than a decline in religiosity. This correction
could potentially lead to far more accurate conclusions and be able to better describe the current
religious landscape of the west.
With this we see that there are more or less identifiable factors that contribute to the
decline in religious authority. And, as previously mentioned, this broad view of declining
religious authority is typically localized in the emerging group known as the religious nones.
Indeed, “religious authority” is not in decline for members of institutional religions and would
not be an object of concern if not for the masses of people who are leaving these institutions.
Thus, the nones are often seen as the primary locus, or the ultimate example of, the loss of
religious authority. Theoretical work surrounding the nones often speaks in these negative terms
of loss and subtraction. Furthermore, the decline in religious authority and the growth of the
nones is viewed as working in tandem. While we will attempt to argue against these “subtraction
stories” as Taylor calls them, our previous argument stands: any discussion of the religious nones
must entail a discussion of authority and the lack thereof.

13

José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1994).
14

Mark Chaves, “Secularization as Declining Religious Authority,” Social Forces 72, no.
3 (Mar. 1994): 749-774.
11

Most of the work on the spiritual but not religious is in agreement with this analysis.
Almost all recent scholarship emphasizes the role authority plays in the lives of the nones.
Authority, and its lack, is a focal point not only in scholarship concerned with the lives of those
who are a part of this group, but it is also relevant in the study of the group itself. What scholars
who interview and study the nones often observe is a hesitancy or outright rejection of the
authority of the traditional religious institutions. It is also important to note that this rejection is
not only of the specific teachings or doctrines of the religion but also of the institution’s authority
itself. Elizabeth Drescher notes, “For Nones, ‘religion’ carries historical, ideological, and
political baggage that is imagined as having traveled into contemporary life like a grumpy,
argumentative uncle from the old country— stilted language, silly costumes, dated music, and an
assumed (but by now largely evacuated) authority in tow.”15 From this we see that nones do not
only reject religion because of doctrines, even though this does often play a large role in
disaffiliation. We instead see that it is a combination of the teachings and the authority that is
often a deterrent. Authority itself is unimportant to the nones.
Even Charles Taylor’s monumental work on secular society emphasizes the role authority
plays in the nones’ views of their religious preferences, and of the ways scholars have discussed
them. When discussing the idea of a search for meaning he gets to the heart of the issue,

This kind of search is often called by its practitioners ‘spirituality’, and is opposed
to ‘religion’. This contrast reflects the rejection of ‘institutional religion’, that is,
the authority claims made by churches which see it as their mandate to preempt
the search, or to maintain it within certain limits, and above all to dictate a certain
code of behavior.16
15

Elizabeth Drescher, Choosing Our Religion: The Spiritual Lives of America’s Nones
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 45.
16

Taylor, A Secular Age, 509.
12

We can assume here that Taylor is referring to the religious nones. Moreover, Taylor seems to be
outlining the definition of this group in terms of “seeking” and “quest.” This entire project or
“quest” of being a none, on the view set forth here by Taylor, then, runs directly counter to both
institutional religion and to the obedience it demands of its adherents. This opinion is very much
shared by Robert C. Fuller in his book concerning the spiritual but not religious. In terms similar
to search and quest, Linda Mercadante makes this point clear when she claims, “At base, the
conceptual amputation of spirituality from religion is a way to get out from under the external
constraints of authorities, traditions, or institutional bonds, and personalize one’s spiritual
quest.”17
We see from this scholarship that the nones are skeptical of or indifferent to external
authority in all forms. But there must be something within each none that beckons them towards
this preference; there must be some sort of voice that guides them to this conclusion. There is a
reduction of obedience, but there is also an addition of something else. Whatever this inclination
is, it implies that the nones are not totally without some form of governance along their search
since adhering to authority seems to be breaking some sort of rule or law. Whatever guides this
preference, then, must be authoritative or powerful in some sense. Thus, some sort of structure
still reasonably exists in the life of the nones or else they would not have any grounds on which
to oppose religious institutions. This power, however, resides in themselves as opposed to an
external institution. If we were to return to the quotations above, we would notice the importance
of personal autonomy in spiritual seeking in nearly every one of them. Further, each of the
scholars mentioned emphasizes the importance of “self-authorization” or what we have called

17

Mercadante, Belief Without Borders, 6.
13

self-empowerment when discussing the nones. Scholars such as Wade Clark Roof further this
idea by confirming much of the modern religious landscape has turned inward to the self.18 Thus,
the notion that the nones empower themselves is equally important to understanding them since
it is the means by which they justify their spirituality and their search for meaning.19 The story of
the nones is not solely one of subtraction. It also brings something new to the religious
landscape. Not only has something been lost, but a shift has occurred.

Self-Authorization and Religious Expertise
From all this, it would be correct to claim that nones are not only skeptical of religion but
are skeptical of external authority itself. As we have seen, there is overwhelming agreement
amongst scholars that this is the case. But this would not be a complete picture. We see from the
excerpts above that the concept of authority and the practice of spiritual seeking are at odds. The
two are more accurately seen as mutually exclusive. And in the same way that skepticism of
authority defines the none stance, so too does this need for autonomous seeking. These two
notions are indivisible in terms of defining the nones. Autonomous spiritual seeking (the act of
being a none) requires that the authority that traditionally resided in the institutions be rejected or
absent.
This definition of a none, which is very similar to Nancy Ammerman’s findings in her
book Sacred Stories, Spiritual Tribes, then, is a dialectic: the negation of authority from religious
institutions goes hand in hand with the ability of the individual to make judgements, claims, and

18

Wade Clark Roof, Spiritual Marketplace: Baby Boomers and the Remaking of
American Religion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
19

Drescher, Choosing Our Religion: The Spiritual Lives of America’s Nones, 3.
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decisions on matters related to spirituality or the divine.20 The subtraction of institutional
authority implies the affirmation of the self, spirituality, and spiritual seeking. This definition
contains distinctly negative and positive elements that form the whole. It is important to note
here, however, that authority only exists within a community. For reasons that will be discussed
further in chapters 1 and 2, the idea of “self-authorization” is an oxymoron. Given the nature of
authority, one cannot authorize one’s self after being removed from a community. While I am in
agreement with Mercadante and many others that a shift has occurred in traditional religious
authority, it is too simplistic to assert that authority has moved from institution to individual
without thoroughly examining authority itself.21 Authority cannot simply move into the
individual because it relies on a moral community for its construction. Religious authority more
accurately has disappeared for the nones due to their individual empowerment. If this is the case,
the negative elements of our definition should be associated with authority with the positive
elements being associated with increasing individual empowerment.
While much of scholarship is concerned with the negative aspects of the nones, this study
will privilege the positive. The positive side of this definition, the autonomy of the individual to
make judgements on matters related to spirituality, is a domain that has until now primarily been
under the control of religious institutions and the experts who populate these institutions (i.e.,
pastors, priests, rabbis, brahmins, etc.). These institutions, up to this point, had been seen as
authoritative bodies in making such judgements. They were seen as those with what we might
call “religious expertise.” Because the nones cannot be viewed as authorities or self-authorizing,
however, I argue that it makes more sense to view the nones as religious experts. This claim is

20

Ammerman, Sacred Stories, Spiritual Tribes, 51.

21

Mercadante, Belief Without Borders,73.
15

bolstered by the fact that in the present moment expertise in matters concerning the divine seems
to be up for grabs by anyone who would like to claim it. Indeed, many are claiming it, and a
large portion of these are nones.
The central contribution of this study is to look at the empowerment of the nones through
the lenses of authority and expertise. And through these lenses we will come to the simple
conclusion that the nones are religious experts. If we were to take the five attitudes that define
professionalism for sociologist Richard H. Hall, we would see that the nones can reasonably fit
into all but one of his categories.22 While the nones do not rely on institutional structures the way
traditional clergy do, they do rely on their ability to make autonomous decisions, their belief that
they have the ability to diagnose problems, their own self-regulation, and their personal calling.
The nones, indeed, have all these attitudes when they are related to spiritual seeking. Nones,
then, seem to mimic what we could call a religious professionalism in that they are able to act as
experts in the realm of spirituality, a realm previously inhabited only by the clergy.
The central question of the nones does not have to do with how religious ministry will
survive in a society that does not believe in God, as scholars like Andrew Root claim.23 This is
undone by the fact that the majority of nones still believe in a higher power. The more poignant
question is how religion will survive in a society that does not need ministers. How will religion
change in a nation populated by people who believe they have as much of a right to religious
expertise as the ministers? These questions point to the fact that the nones primarily stand in
opposition to the clergy rather than religion itself. While much scholarship has been concerned
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with the ways in which the nones are progenitors of the death of religion, this study will show
how the nones portray shifting religious sentiments in terms of authority and expertise.
This analysis also seems appropriate as we are living through a time when there is a
considerable rejection of experts in all fields. One merely needs to turn on the news to hear the
mass rejection of expertise that plagues the country. Everyone from doctors, to politicians, to
scientists is being refuted based on the simple claim that their adversaries know more, or know
better, than they do. There are even discussions occurring nowadays over the idea of lay
expertise (a very intriguing idea in relation to the nones) and how this functions alongside
traditional experts in the field. While a considerable amount of sociological and philosophical
work has been done on expertise as it relates to the public sphere, little to none of it has been
applied to a study of religion or the nones. By looking at the nones through the lens of expertise,
we will see that the nones indeed reflect much of the qualities of religious experts and should be
viewed as experts themselves.
To paint a full picture of the nones, we have to incorporate those subtractive aspects
concerning religious authority as well as those additive attributes concerning religious expertise.
Where Roof would like to claim that the decrease in religious authority and the increase in
“spiritual ferment” make it difficult to pin down the current religious landscape, as if the two are
distinct,24 I claim that these two are not separate phenomena but are actually one and the same.
While those negative aspects have largely been privileged by scholarship on this topic, this study
will bring to light a new perspective on the positive attributes of the nones, by emphasizing the
role of religious expertise in both traditional religious settings and how this expertise is being
used by the nones. When added to our original definition, along with all that was previously
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mentioned, we can conclude that the nones are a religious group that rejects external authority in
favor of personal authority in terms of spiritual autonomy. Or, more concisely, the nones are a
group of individuals who empower themselves in matters of religion. While nones are motivated
to empower themselves for different reasons and indeed even empower themselves in different
ways, the empowered individual, by and large, is what binds all nones together.
Examining the nones in such a way is important for the study of this emerging and
rapidly growing group, but it is also important for the study of religion. If the nones can be
reasonably called religious experts, what does this mean for the current state of religion? How
has religion changed so that an individual with no training could now claim expert status in the
realm of religion? What does the field of religious studies or the clergy do when a significant
portion of the population believes they no longer need guidance from the experts and would
rather claim expert status for themselves? While this study cannot answer all these questions, I
hope that it helps shed light on all the changing religious sentiments the nones represent, not just
the decline of traditional religious institutions.

This Study
If it is indeed true that the one common thread between the nones is the fact that they
empower themselves within the realm of religion, the aim of this study is simply to understand
the nones on their own terms. This study is an attempt to look critically at definitional attributes
of the nones and examine them in ways that make sense with one another. By doing so we will
see that they have empowered themselves in spiritual matters, that the nones are indeed religious
experts. As opposed to many of the studies that have come before, I will be taking a survey of
thought surrounding ideas of authority and expertise, applying these to religious contexts, and
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finally applying them to the nones themselves. Instead of adding to the ever-growing amount of
scholarship that tries to theorize why the nones are growing so quickly, this study will aim to
understand the nones from the perspective of religious expertise and argue for their status as
religious experts. If this argument helps scholars understand why the nones are growing so
rapidly, however, this would certainly not be shunned as counterproductive to the project. This
study also makes no attempt to give advice on how to reincorporate the nones back into
traditional religion or make value claims as to the legitimacy of the beliefs of the unaffiliated.
Furthermore, this study will not tread the well-worn paths of simply relating the nones to
individualism, secularization, or pluralism. While I use these concepts, I only do so only to
bolster my claims that the nones are religious experts. I do all of this so that we might expand our
understanding of the nones and the current religious landscape.
I go about my analysis by firstly defining the terms authority and expertise. As we will
see, there is no shortage of definitions for these two words so we must narrow down our
language if we want to study the nones properly. Chapter 2 will be dedicated to surveying the
different definitions of authority and expertise, showing how these interact with one another, and
establishing definitions we can use in our analysis of the nones. We will see here that the notions
of authority and expertise are not as related as some might think. In fact, I will argue that there
are adequate reasons to place the two in distinction to each other. With this distinction we will
begin to see why the nones are not religious authorities or self-authorizing, but rather observe
why it makes more sense to view them in terms of expertise.
Having defined the two words that define much of the content of this study, we will then
begin to apply these concepts to religious contexts in Chapter 3. Here we will begin to see how
simply claiming that the self has been authorized is largely contradictory to definitions of
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authority established in the previous chapter. For this reason, we turn to our definition of
expertise in order to more accurately describe the nones and the ways in which they go about
their spiritual seeking. Before we can confidently call the nones religious experts, however, we
apply our definition of expertise to religious contexts in order to determine what religious
expertise might entail. After an analysis of expertise in relation to religious contexts we come to
the conclusion that there is such a thing as religious expertise, and it seems as though the nones
have obtained some form of it.
In Chapter 4, we apply our definition of religious expertise explicitly to the nones.
Drawing on ethnographic sources and interviews with nones, we begin to observe the ways in
which this group explicitly behaves as religious experts according to the definitions we have
outlined in previous chapters. These behaviors, which are largely based on the knowledge and
the religious practices of the nones, help demonstrate that they are essentially experts of their
own religions. Each none has an individualized religion, and each religion needs what Weber
calls a priest. Thus, the nones are the priests of their individual religions.
Finally, Chapter 5 will discuss the ways in which religious expertise has migrated from
institutions to individuals. This chapter analyzes different historical developments in thought in
order to chart the progression of religion as a communal phenomenon to religion as an individual
phenomenon. By observing this shift, we will see how religious expertise was stripped from
institutions and how the untrained laity is able to possess it so unquestionably today. Here, as
well, we touch on some examples from recent scholarship of ways in which academia has started
to view the nones and the lay as religious experts. The popular notion of lived religion within
academic circles today points to the fact that not only have the nones become experts on a
personal level, but that scholars are now recognizing a level of religious expertise occurring
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within this group. It is no longer the case that only the individual recognizes their ability to act as
a religious expert. The broader public and even academia is empowering these groups and
recognizing their religious expertise.
The loss of religious authority and the rise in religious self-authorization or new
“religious experts” cannot be seen as distinct phenomena. They are part of one whole, and both
contribute to the prominence of the nones. We cannot solely view the deterioration of traditional
religious adherence, attendance, etc. in terms of decline, but must also look to the ways in which
other non-traditional spiritual practices are increasing. The lack of authority in institutions,
combined with relatively unchanged numbers in religious belief necessitate an increase in
religious power from somewhere else. And those wielding these new powers can only be
understood as experts if they are so bold as to stand against these institutions. We see examples
of this wherever we view the nones. An overwhelming amount of people all across the country
are starting think they can mediate the divine for themselves. For these people there is no longer
a need for religious professionals within institutions for the reason that they now can perform the
function of these professionals for themselves. Indeed, we now live in a nation heavily populated
with so called religious experts, a nation of priests, and these are priests unto themselves.
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AUTHORITY AND EXPERTISE

We have seen how much scholarship defines the nones in terms of authority. Whether
this discussion is framed as a movement from institution to individual or absence of religious
authority altogether is not important at this point. What is most pressing is the fact that most
scholars discuss the nones by talking about religious authority. The argument I will lay out,
however, aims to show that the language of authority is falsely attributed to the nones and their
spirituality. For this reason, I frame the argument in terms of expertise and argue that the
religious nones, as a self-empowering group, can be seen as a group of religious experts. In order
to make this argument in a meaningful way, however, we must first define the two terms that are
the most crucial to this study, these being authority and expertise. We will begin here with a
definition of authority followed by a definition of expertise. Having done so, we will conclude
with an attempt to synthesize these two definitions with each other.

Authority
The notion of power or authority is hardly new to discussions surrounding social theory
or the sociology of religion. Moreover, many of these definitions incorporate religious elements.
From Weber’s famous ideas of charismatic authority to Foucault’s notion of power/knowledge
and pastoral power, social theory has a deep and complex history of definitions of authority as
they relate to religious groups. These definitions also persist into recent scholarship on the issue
as theorists even in the present day continue to provide new definitions of authority and its role
in society or religion. All this to say, there is not a shortage of definitions or sources discussing
authority that we can attempt to apply to the nones.
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To begin defining authority, then, it would be beneficial to start with what most theorists
agree on. To do this we would have to begin with an analysis of power. Power, as seen by much
of social theory, is the ability to bend the will of another. Rather famously, Foucault described
power as the ability to act upon the actions of others.25 This bending of the will can be done
through all sorts of means, but coercion is the prime example used in social thought. If someone
is pointing a gun at me and ordering me to give up my wallet, they have power over me because
my will is being coerced through potential force. I do not want to give up my money, but I do so
that I am not harmed. Power, then, lacks depth and can be seen as objective in the sense that in
many cases it is universal. In the same way that 2+2=4, if one has power over another the
powerful are going to get what they want. To refuse someone with a gun is, most likely, a death
sentence.
Defining power in this way is important for understanding authority. Authority, most
social theorists since Weber agree, is the legitimate or just use of power. To use the previous
example, if I, for whatever reason, think that my adversary is justified in pointing a gun at me
and asking for my money, then this becomes a relation of authority rather than of power. In both
instances I give my adversary the money, but for completely different reasons. If we were to
leave our definition of authority as solely that form of power which is seen as legitimate,
however, we would miss something crucial. Where Weber and many of his contemporaries 26
were concerned with the ways in which the state, as the locus of power, legitimates the use of its
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power through authority,27 theorists after him turned away from authority being located strictly
in bureaucratic or political apparatuses. Much of the theory after Weber, aside from being more
focused on individuals and everyday relationships, is keen on emphasizing that the use of
persuasion and coercion must be absent if authority is to be achieved. Authority does not exist
where these two are present. Indeed, if one is being coerced or persuaded to action, one is under
the power of another rather than authority. If I view the one who asks for my money as
authoritative, the gun is unnecessary in obtaining what he or she desires, and I will give it freely.
Coercion and persuasion, then, are key in identifying whether one is dealing with power or
authority and is what makes these two distinct from one another.
This analysis of power and authority is largely supported by Hannah Arendt. Her essay
“What Is Authority?” deals with the question of authority in modern society. While there are
aspects of this essay that some find problematic, such as her argument that authority has
vanished from the modern world, she does a good job defining authority for her readers. To
Arendt, authority is the legitimate hierarchy of a society. She claims,

The authoritarian relation between the one who commands and the one who obeys
rests neither on common reason nor on the power of the one who commands;
what they have in common is the hierarchy itself, whose rightness and legitimacy
both recognize and where both have their predetermined stable place.28

From this we see that authority is free of coercion and persuasion. More importantly, however,
we see that Arendt sees persuasion as synonymous with reason. The ability to persuade rests on
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common reason so reason too must be left out of a theory of authority. It is the structure itself
that is seen as authoritative rather than the people within it. I see the president as an authority
because of his or her office within the hierarchical governmental structure that I see as
legitimate. Another crucial component of authority for Arendt is that its foundation and
legitimacy lie outside of itself. What she means by this is that we do not respect authority in and
of itself. We respect authorities based on their historic institutionalization, our community, etc.
To Arendt, one of the reasons we respect the hierarchy is because of its effectiveness in bygone
eras. In this sense, we can see Arendt’s definition being rather similar to what Weber called
traditional authority. From Arendt, then, we see that authority is indeed defined in
contradistinction to those attributes that make up power (coercion and persuasion) as well as
being made of something outside of itself; authority simpliciter is not possible.
As we move away from Arendt, however, theorists start to lean away from the traditional
approaches to power and authority. Dennis Wrong, for example, attempts to incorporate coercion
and persuasion into his theories of authority. Wrong is consistent with theories that come before
and after him in his analysis of the authoritative relation. He writes, “If the essence of persuasion
is the presentation of arguments, the essence of authority is the issuance of commands.”29 The
language of command and obedience is common in theory surrounding authority, but he
mistakenly attempts to categorize authority too broadly. In his analysis there are five different
types of authority, and some of these incorporate coercion and persuasion explicitly into their
function. This puts Wrong in direct contradiction with thinkers like Arendt and much of the
traditional thought surrounding the role and function of authority.

29

Dennis Wrong, Power: Its Forms, Bases, and Uses (New Brunswick: Transaction
Publishers, 1997), 35.
25

As thought surrounding authority continues to progress, however, we come back into the
realm of “orthodox” authority theory. A recent example of this includes Bruce Lincoln. Lincoln
is one who moves away from the traditional theorists, in part, by choosing to analyze authority in
its material contexts. Because of his emphasis on the material when studying authority, Lincoln
argues that it is best understood as an effect rather than a hierarchy. Authority to Lincoln is

the capacity to produce consequential speech, quelling doubts and winning the
trust of the audiences whom they engage . . . it is best understood in relational
terms as an effect of a posited, perceived, or institutionally ascribed asymmetry
between speaker and audience that permits certain speakers to command not just
the attention but the confidence, respect, and trust of their audience.30

This puts Lincoln at odds with Arendt in that he does not see authority as solely based in
historical hierarchies or absent from the modern world. He is, however, still in line with the
broad strokes of theory concerning authority in that he remains convinced that where coercion
and persuasion are present, authority is not: “In actual practice the exercise of authority depends
less upon ‘the capacity for reasoned elaboration’ as on the presumption made by those subject to
authority that such a capacity exists, or on their calculated and strategic willingness to pretend
they so presume.”31 Furthermore, like Arendt, Lincoln states that when authority becomes
coercion it ceases to be authority.32
There is another vein in scholarship, however, that sees authority as simply tolerated
power, this tolerance being founded in the subject’s determination to fulfill his own self-interests
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even if it means the bending of his will. In the theories set forth by Rodney Stark and William
Sims Bainbridge, among others who subscribe to rational choice theory, authority is something
that is largely, if not completely, indulged based on interest. Proponents of these ideas argue that
“behavior is fundamentally rational in the same way as it is in the case of economic behavior.”33
I begrudgingly accept commands, orders, rules, because it is in my best interest to do so. We
accept the authority of those in power based on the potential fulfillment of our interests, but this
is as far as our respect for these authorities go (if we can even call this respect at all). I bend my
will to the laws of the land because I am not interested in paying a ticket or going to prison. If we
look at authority solely in terms of interest, however, is it so obvious that coercion and
persuasion are absent?
Yes, the will is seen to be bent on a legitimate basis based on its interests, but it is not
clear whether there is an outside element of this that demands the bending of the will. If we were
to look again to the paradigmatic example of a power relation, one holding a gun at me, it is selfinterest that motivates and legitimates my actions. I do not want to die, so I do what my
adversary says. Does this make the one with the gun authoritative? No, because I can be forced
to action by self-interest without seeing this force as just. There is an element of coercion or
persuasion that is inherent in all interest situations because my interests are what those in power
hold over me. Viewed through the lens of self-interest, I do not obey the professor because I
want to be a good student. I obey her so that I do not fail. I do not pay my taxes because I want to
be a good citizen. I pay them so that I am not punished. On a broader level, if we view the world
in terms of interest, the idea of doing something because it is virtuous in itself becomes
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impossible. Authority does not command respect when viewed through the lens of self-interest,
then, but always needs some form of coercion to back it up.
We can critique this form of tolerated authority based on self-interest through the lens of
persuasion as well. Arendt tells us that rationality as a form of dominion over another is not
authority because persuasion is grounded in rationality. For one to reason to another’s
“authority” is thus an exercise in persuasion and consequently grounded in power. The theorists
mentioned above who subscribe to rational choice theory and claim that authority is accepted out
of self-interest, however, often do so on the basis of common rationality. It is rational for me to
obey the powers that be because it benefits me and my interests. But as we have seen, if we posit
rationality at all we get into the realm of power relations based on the fact that persuasion is a
product of reason. If we would like to move in the direction of postmodernism, we could even
argue, as many have, that reason is never disinterested.34 To posit something like rational or
coercive authority, then, does not make any sense; it is rather an oxymoron. Thus, if one is acting
out of self-interest in any capacity, whether it be out of fear of consequences or rational calculus
of benefits, they are participating in power relations rather than those relations based on
authority.
This argument only works to the extent that we can know an individual’s attitude,
however. If one sincerely follows the law out of a genuine respect for the government and his or
her fellow citizen, which is entirely possible, one would be back in the realm of authority. But
there are two important things to notice here. One who is under authority in this sense is not
following the law out of self-interest, and her legitimation of the authority is deeply individual.
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Once we leave behind the baggage of interest, we come to a definition of authority that is much
more in line with the theories of Arendt and Lincoln while also coming to a more
compartmentalized view of authority and power. Where interest blurs the line between authority
and power, blinding the theorist to the distinction between the two, theorists who reject the idea
of self-interest as it relates to the construction of authority are able to come back to the original
definition of authority (the just use of power) in a more robust way that is able to incorporate the
individuals view of what is just. A scholar who accomplishes this is Adam Seligman.
Adam Seligman’s book Modernity’s Wager emphasizes the all-important claim that
authority is subjective, and as subjective it helps construct the self. Utilizing Weber’s
formulation of the forms of legitimacy, Seligman shows that what is most important when
theorizing about authority is the subjective legitimation of the will. To Seligman one is not
coerced when they are under authority. This would indeed be a relation of power; the will is
rather subjugated to inner restraints that are determined by the individual or the self. He writes,
“For authority to exist, as opposed to power, the legitimacy of its actions must be registered in
the subjective consciousness of the actors . . . The inner subjective experience is at the heart of
the phenomenon of authority.”35 On this reading, the one who obeys authorities does not do so
out of coercion or self-interest but does so because the individual simply sees them as
authoritative. Seligman further ties this into views of the self. One follows orders, commands,
rules, because to follow them aligns with a certain sense of self. Seligman uses the example of a
thief when describing this. While there are also commands to not steal, I do not steal because
being a thief contradicts my view of who I am. I am not a thief; therefore, I do not steal. We see
here how Seligman’s formulation, by incorporating subjectivity, is able to make sense of
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authority in relation to power and self-interest. It is only the subjective that gets us out of the
realm of power relations.
This is not all Seligman has to say about authority, however. The subjective sense of
authority still comes from somewhere. Authority still has, to use Seligman’s term, a referent.
This line of thought is very similar to what we saw from Arendt: authority simpliciter is not
possible so it must be grounded in something outside of itself. To Seligman, authority is
subjective insofar as it is related to a community. While authority is based in the self, the self is
subsequently based in society which constructs authority in terms of moral values. He writes,
“What makes . . . rule legitimate, authoritative, accepted, is that it is a collective dictate, not
simply the personal power of the ruler.”36 He makes this claim largely in the language of higher
and lower moral evaluations, which he borrows from Taylor. On the rational choice theory
reading, what is of value is only what promotes my interests. There are no pursuits that are seen
as noble, higher, or virtuous.37 There are then no shared values or morals among individuals per
se. Similarly, when social relations are read in terms of interest, we lose sight of authority. If one,
however, is within a community, value develops in the sense of shared values. Indeed, it is the
community and the ontological basis of the rules of that community that give shape to the morals
and values of an individual according to Seligman. It is the community that defines the rules that
one follows and the roles one takes on if they break these rules, such as being labeled a thief. If
there is not a communal referent, no one plays the game by the same rules and authority becomes
untenable. If there is no communal referent, no rules or values which a community sees as selfforming, “relations between selves are [only] seen in terms of an exchange based on the mutual
36

Seligman, Modernity’s Wager, 38

37

Charles Taylor, “What is human agency?” in Human Agency and Language:
Philosophical Papers 1, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 18-19.
30

interests of the contracting parties.”38 Outside of a community, then, one is largely working
within the realm of power relations, according to Seligman, because there is no shared moral
authority. This also contributes to authority being seen as positional by many. It is one’s position
within the authoritative system, the moral community, that grants them authority Without
community, then, it is impossible for there to be authority at all, and this leaves one only within
the realm of interests, only within the realm of power.
To bring us back to a discussion of the religious nones, however, we now must find a
way to apply this definition of authority to them. We primarily discussed the importance of
authority in relation to the nones, noting that they do not recognize the authority of institutions
and are rather authorizing themselves. And we do in fact see that Seligman’s definition of
authority lines up with certain aspects of this analysis of the nones. The authority of religious
institutions is purely subjective, and nones no longer subjectively believe that it is legitimate to
bend their wills to religious institutions. This is why it is not uncommon to hear certain nones
who are averse to religion arguing that religion is either coercive or persuasive in negative ways.
It is also their view of the self that they subjectively authorize or empower in place of religion.
But what does an “authorization” of the self look like? I have proposed that it is something
similar to expertise. And as the previous chapter argued, we should not study the decline in
authority without paying equal attention to the rise in what I called religious expertise among the
nones. Thus, we must now turn our attention to the role and function of expertise.

38

Seligman, Modernity’s Wager, 6
31

Expertise
As previously discussed, we now live in a time of crisis in terms of expertise. This crisis
has encouraged new voices in scholarship to conduct studies and write books dealing with the
questions pertaining to it. What is expertise? How does it function within a democracy? Will
expertise ever be successful against public opinion within democratic states? These are all
questions that are attempting to be answered as lay people continue to challenge the claims made
by experts in different fields. Before all of this anxiety about expertise, however, there was a
related area of research that took on a different name. The sociology of professions was largely
thought of as a subfield of sociology that studied the way in which expertise functioned. The
difference between this and contemporary notions of expertise, however, was that the sociology
of professions viewed expertise as something that is attributed rather than something tangible.39
That said, there are still important insights about expertise we can only gain from the sociology
of professions. Consequently, we will be looking at both the sociology of expertise and the
sociology of professions to analyze what this concept is.
What, then, is expertise? Some theorists posit that there is so much ambiguity around the
term that it is difficult to know for sure what we mean when we discuss expertise. Gil Eyal tells
us that even “the first sustained discussion of expertise was occasioned by the difficulty
presented by a new and confusing claim to expert status.”40 While the meaning and history of the
word are murky, there are common threads we can gather from thought on the topic, one of these
common threads being that expertise is inextricably linked to knowledge. It is undeniable that an
expert in, say, the field of medicine simply knows more than the lay person about this subject.
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While it is easy to get bogged down in epistemology here (what type of knowledge this is, is this
knowledge attributed or embodied, etc.), and indeed much of contemporary thought on expertise
does, we will begin an analysis of expertise through the lens of knowledge in a general sense. As
Eliot Freidson tells us, “Within any particular culture of any complexity and size one can locate
both a body of knowledge common to all and specialized knowledge that is available only to
some.”41 This privatized type of knowledge that is only available to some, the sociology of
professions agrees, is what defines expertise. Indeed, certain theories of expertise have been
entirely based on typologies of knowledge.42 This knowledge is also seen by many to be highly
abstract and formal. Formal knowledge, then, is the name that is often attributed to the special
knowledge of experts. The experts are set apart from the rest of their fellows because they have
access to this formal knowledge. This is what makes expertise very elitist and authoritarian. By
its very definition, expertise draws distinct lines between those within and those without. This
has led to some theorists discussing these boundaries and how they are shaped, such as Andrew
Abbott who discusses this largely in terms of the jurisdictions of certain abstract forms of
knowledge.
We are, however, missing something if we say that expertise is solely a form of
knowledge that one can obtain. There is a functional aspect to expertise that this definition
misses. Much like the way in which we used the word over a hundred years ago, the expert is
often called upon to perform a task, provide judgement, or offer advice.43 Eyal is clear that the
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only reason experts exist is precisely for them to perform a function, and this function is as one
who uses their formal knowledge to explicate or complete tasks. It is, again, undeniable that the
expert in medicine is expected to not only know more than the lay person, but they are expected
to be able to apply their knowledge to the practice of medicine. The expert not only knows-that,
but they know-how.44 This functional role expertise plays in society is what inspires Collins and
Evans to call the pinnacle of expert knowledge “contributory knowledge” because this expert
contributes to their ongoing practice. To Collins and Evans, contributory knowledge is so
embodied by the expert that they do not even have to think anymore when performing their
tasks. The surgeon with contributory knowledge, for example, performs brain surgery the same
way she rides a bike. So not only are experts separate from the public in terms of knowledge, but
they are also supposed to be separate in terms of their practical skills. With this we can see that
another key aspect of expertise is not solely knowledge but the applicability of this knowledge,
the fact that this knowledge performs a function.
This leads us to a final general point about expertise. The expert is seen as one who
knows more, and performs certain tasks better or more efficiently, than the lay person. In line
with the idea of expertise inherently forming a hierarchy of knowledge, it also forms a hierarchy
of the way this knowledge is applied. To put this in other words, these two attributes contribute
to an expert being seen as an authority in their particular subject or field. The language of
expertise is seen as discourse that is authoritative in the area of the expert. It draws clear
boundaries between who should be listened to and those who should not have a voice on certain
issues. For example, I take my broken-down car to a mechanic first rather than having my fatherin-law look at it because I trust that the mechanic will fix the problem in a more effective way.
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This is an act of trust in the expertise of the mechanic. But what if my father-in-law insists that
he knows better than the trained professional? Indeed, what if the mechanic has in the past failed
to fix my car properly, or even made my problems worse? This aspect of expertise is what often
brings it under scrutiny in democratic societies, especially in America.45 The voice of the lay
masses is not always correct, but public opinion is more important to democracy than the
opinions of a few experts. Democracy is incompatible with technocracy.46 This is why many still
do not believe in the effectiveness of vaccines or the dangers of global warming. The conflict
between expertise and democracy is indeed a crisis47 but it is not obvious that the experts should
always be listened to.
Much of the literature on expertise is quick to point to something called lay expertise or
what Collins and Evans call the “folk wisdom” view. This concept has to do with the fact that it
is not uncommon for expert advice to be wrong. It is also not uncommon for the worries and
anxieties of the masses to be confirmed when the experts turn out to be wrong. Eyal uses the
example of radioactive contamination of the Cumbrian Fells to illustrate why expert opinion is
volatile. When experts were called in to assess the risk of radiation to the land, these experts
were nuclear scientists and knew very little about the effect the radiation would have on the
livestock and soil of the area. These insights could have been voiced, however, by local farmers
or different experts in soil science if the authorities had thought to ask them. Following the
advice of experts and overlooking the lay farmers in this instance led to a catastrophe. The
experts in this case were very wrong about the outcome, and the local farmers turned out be
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right. The lines between expert and lay, then, become less defined when they are called on to
solve problems. Expertise can perhaps reside in the minds of nonexperts. At the very least, the
lines between expert and lay are more permeable than previously thought.48
While expertise is indeed a very difficult concept to pin down, these broad ideas that we
have drawn from theorists help us to narrow what expertise is in a general sense. Many of the
theorists mentioned above would agree with the facts that expertise is an accumulation of formal
knowledge, is meant to perform tasks, is authoritative, and that it is not solely in the hands of the
expert. While many disagree on the specifics of these attributes, such as the epistemological hills
they would prefer to die on or the pragmatic theories they insist on keeping, we have painted
here with a broad enough brush to encapsulate those thinkers who reside on all sides of the
spectrum. For the most part, scholars from the sociology of professions to pragmatists agree on
these basic attributes of expertise.

Authority in Relation to Expertise
A connection between authority and expertise might seem obvious. But we must be
restrained when discussing the relationship between authority and expertise. Many would like to
jump to definitions of expertise that assume it is just authoritative knowledge, tempted to think
that the relationship between authority and expertise is similar to that of squares and rectangles.
What I mean by this is that this reading sees not all authority as grounded in expertise, but
certainly sees all expertise being grounded in authority. This might be true depending on one’s
definition of authority, but it is not obvious that expertise can simply be viewed as that form of
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knowledge which is authoritative in every case. Indeed, for our circumstances we must make
sure that our definitions of expertise and authority are in line before we assume that expertise can
be seen as authoritative knowledge. We must read this relationship of authority and expertise in
terms of the definitions that have been outlined above.
The key insights of our definition of authority are defining what makes it distinct from
power. To review, authority is the legitimate or just bending of the will. But what we define as
legitimate or just is deeply subjective and comes from our place in society. Authority, as
Seligman tells us, is based within the subjective experience of an individual within a community.
Authority is distinct from power for these reasons as well as its rejection of coercion or
persuasion. Authority resides solely in the eyes of the beholder, and it is constructed based on the
moral values one obtains from his or her community. This definition of authority puts it in direct
contradiction with power, which is the bending of the will in general. Power relies on coercion
and persuasion as well as refuses the subjective and communal. It can do so by using force or
relying on objective rationality. What we have called interest calculus, or the “legitimate”
bending of the will out of self-interest, relies on this objective rationality and is thus not a form
of authority but a form of power. This form of tolerated power is not the same as reverent
authority. It is clear, then, that authority resides outside the realm of power relations insofar as
these pertain to interest calculus and rational choice theories. When I make decisions based
solely on my interests, even if these are my best interests, I am within the realm of power
relations because interest relies on objective rationality.
The question we now face is whether the “authority” of expertise behaves in ways similar
to the definition of authority outlined above. The answer we find as we dive further into this
question is that expertise is, in fact, not congruous with this definition of authority and this
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primarily has to do with the proximity of expertise to power. We have defined authority in such a
way that it is impossible for something to be within a power relation and still be deemed
authoritative. What we will find as we explore expertise, however, is that it is deeply grounded in
power relations. In fact, the whole purpose of expertise relies on power relations. While many
theorists like to claim that expertise is authoritative, they do so without giving proper thought to
the idea of authority itself. Furthermore, some theorists also subscribe to rational choice and
subsequently incorporate authority and power into one homogenous phenomenon when it is
clearly not. For this reason, we have many claiming that experts and expertise are authoritative
when in fact it is simply powerful.
The primary reason why expertise should be seen as a discourse based in power as
opposed to authority has to do with its function. As we have previously discussed, experts
perform a function and role within society and this is primarily as those who speak with power
on given issues. For example, the medical expert’s function is to give their patient adequate care
in the form of guidance on what they should be doing to alleviate their pain. This is why Eyal
tells us that “what experts often do is give advice and opinion, that is, they explicate.”49 This
aspect of expertise puts it within the realm of power relations because it deals with calculations
of self-interest. The will is seen to be bent on a legitimate basis with regard to expert opinion, but
as we have mentioned previously it is not clear that there is not an element of coercion or
persuasion present in these relations. In fact, the will is often if not always bent regarding selfinterest when it comes to experts. I follow the advice of the doctor because I do not want to get
sick or remain sick. Again, it is not clear that there is not a form of coercion or persuasion
present within this advice. In large part I am persuaded to follow the advice of experts because it
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is reasonable to do so, or I am coerced because I do not want deal with the consequences of not
heeding their advice.
Furthermore, expertise viewed within its functional context must be read as a means-ends
or social contract relationship which neglects the place of authority within the life of an
individual self. Thus, I do not view the expert as authoritative out of any subjective moral value I
place in them, but they hold power over me insofar as I need their advice. There is something the
expert has that I need, primarily in the form of abstract knowledge. If they did not, I would no
longer need them. I view an expert as an “authority” insofar as it benefits me. Without the object
of their power, they would no longer have power over me. One might be tempted to think that I
am forcing this modern liberal reading on the term expertise, but this is not the case. The idea of
contract and means-ends is engrained in the very idea itself. As Eyal shows, the etymology of the
word implies that the very term has an implicit contractual nature.50 Expertise as contractual,
then, is not authoritative because it does not construct any part of the self; I cease to care about
the opinion of the expert as soon as my issue is resolved. Here we see that expertise also
contradicts those other elements attributed to authority by Seligman, these being subjectivity and
the role this plays in constructing the self in relation to moral authority.
We see that expertise resists being authoritative based solely on its functional role within
society, but I am hardly the first to notice this resistance. Eliot Freidson begins his book
Professional Powers by acknowledging that knowledge is power and that it is the knowledge of
the professionals, of the experts, that gives them power. Indeed, for Freidson all of expertise, the
professions, is grounded on the fact that they have power over those who do not have access to
their abstract formal knowledge. He writes, “The use of formal knowledge to order human affairs
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is of course an exercise of power, an act of domination over those who are the object.”51 To
Freidson it is absolutely clear that the formal knowledge of experts, and the ways in which they
use this formal knowledge, is based in relations of power. Using Freidson’s definitions, the
expert or professional is clearly not an authority but a figure who holds power over another.
Not only Friedson, but one of the most prominent voices in social theory in recent years
has also noticed the relationship between power and expert knowledge. Foucault’s notion of
“power/knowledge” perfectly illustrates the connection between expertise and power. Much like
Freidson, Foucault thought that knowledge was power, but his thought was much more complex
than the banal platitude suggests. Rather than simply arguing that knowing something gives one
power over another, Foucault was of the assumption that knowledge itself was also determined
by power. John Rousse shows this by observing, “During the 1970s [Foucault] argued that the
reorganizations of knowledge also constituted new forms of power and domination.”52 In other
words, knowledge is constituted in power and power is constituted in knowledge. The two are
symbiotic for Foucault.53 If we can equate what Foucault calls knowledge here with expert
knowledge more generally, which we reasonably can, his analysis of expertise would largely
place it within the realm of power. While Foucault would have many differing opinions about
what constitutes authority than the ideas set forth by this study, it is still important to
acknowledge the fact that expertise is seen by one of the most prominent figures in the study of
power as a relation of power.
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We see from all of this that much of scholarship agrees that expert knowledge is firmly
grounded in power relations. While many claim that expertise is “authoritative” knowledge, they
do so with a misconception of authority in mind, relying on rational choice theories and the like.
If one sees authority as being distinct from power, as we have previously argued that it should
be, we have to view expertise as being removed from authority as well. We see from the scholars
mentioned above that expertise should not be seen as authoritative precisely because it is
grounded in persuasion and coercion. These two concepts, however, do not mix with authority
on our reading. Thus, expertise and authority cannot be homogenous and cannot exist together in
harmony.

Conclusion
In sum, the definition of authority this study will use going forward draws heavily on the
work of Seligman. Authority is the legitimate bending of the will when there is no coercion or
persuasion present. While some view authority as any legitimate bending of the will, even if this
legitimation is based on self-interest, we have shown that authority lies outside of interest
calculus because it is not obvious that there is no coercion or persuasion present within these.
Furthermore, authority occurs when one subjectively views his or her bending of will as
legitimate. This subjective aspect of authority constructs an idea of the self and is grounded in
moral values that are subsequently products of societies or groups we are born into. I do not steal
because I hold stealing to be a morally deficient activity. Where some view authority in terms of
interest, we see with this definition that this reading cannot account for subjective moral values
that inspire some to act outside of self-interest. No matter how much it would benefit me, I do
not steal because it contradicts something about my personhood. I am not a thief so it does not
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make sense for me to steal. This definition is also seen in contradistinction to power. Where
power largely operates in relations of self-interest, authority does not. On our reading, power and
authority are distinct from one another.
Likewise, the definition this study will use for expertise will rely on the broad strokes
definition we have outlined here. Expertise is a form of abstract knowledge that only a certain
group of people has access to. This formal knowledge not only separates it from lay knowledge
in itself, but expertise is also intended to be functional. Experts perform a role within society as
advice givers and problem solvers. Experts also perform this task better and more efficiently than
those without their abstract knowledge. The performance of these tasks and the providing of
advice being the primary function of experts. While many theorists would say this theory does
not dive deep enough into the territories of epistemology and practice theory, this broad
definition will work for our purposes.
Lastly it is important to notice the relationship between authority and expertise. While
many claim that experts are authorities, it is not obvious that expertise relies on authority. We
found, in fact, that based on its functional nature expertise relies more often on power relations
rather than those based in authority. One is often either persuaded or coerced to follow the advice
of experts, and this often happens within the realm of self-interest. Many have indeed heard that
it is “in their best interest” to heed the advice of experts. With this we saw the reasons why
expertise is seen as a discourse that is grounded in power, and as a discourse grounded in power
it cannot be seen as relying on authority.
The ways in which we should apply these definitions to the nones is not immediately
obvious. We have outlined an argument as to why it makes little sense to claim that the nones are
“self-authorizing” as individuals set apart from moral communities, but we do not know at this
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point how to apply our definitions of authority and expertise to the nones as a religious group, if
we even can. Furthermore, to apply the definition of expertise presented here to the nones at this
point is unwarranted because much of their religious identity would still not be understood; we
do not yet know how authority and expertise interact with religion. The immediate application of
these terms to the nones, then, would be far too hasty. We must still examine whether religion
and religious groups can be seen in terms of expertise at all. Thus, the next chapter will deal with
the concept of religion as it relates to our definitions of authority and expertise.
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RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY AND RELIGIOUS EXPERTISE

We have seen that some scholars have argued that the nones are best understood as a
religiously self-authorizing group. In order to understand this self-authorization, this thesis
analyzed authority and expertise as concepts and found that the two are incongruous. The ways
in which these two concepts interact with the none label have to do with the positive side of the
none definition mentioned previously. “Self-authorization,” the trait that is positively attributed
to the nones by so many scholars, clearly relies on some form of authority or power as it is what
enables the nones to reject the authority of institutions and approve of their own spiritual
autonomy. Defining authority in contradistinction to power makes it possible to examine what it
means to be self-authorized in terms of religion. Here I will rely on Weber and Seligman to
outline a theory of religious authority. From this, I will observe what it means to be “selfauthorized” in relation to religion. In line with the previous findings, it will be made clear that
self-authorization and the authority of religion are akin to oil and water, in that they do not mix
well. The assertions of many scholars that religious authority has simply moved into the
individual, then, is inadequate.
Self-authorization, in terms of the nones, is the idea that individuals can grant themselves
the authority that traditionally resided in institutional structures. The authority of religious
institutions on matters of spirituality, transcendence, or salvation now resides in the individual. If
we were to return to the definition of authority outlined by Seligman, however, we would be
reminded of the communal foundation of authority. While Seligman’s notion of authority is
deeply subjective and based on the individual’s internalized values, these values are determined
by the community of which one is a part. Authority exists as a product of internalized values, but

44

internalized values only exist when there has been an acceptance of propositions that legitimate
certain actions over others. These propositions occur within a community of people who accept
the same “rules of the game.” Seligman writes, “the rules of the game ultimately refer to
principles of justice, even if these principles are no more than the maintenance of the game itself
or, by extension, of society, which . . . is the essence of the sacred and so, we are forced to admit,
of authority itself.”54 It is clear from this that authority can only exist within certain communal
contexts. Everything outside of these contexts must be based in power. The problems with selfauthorization, then, are immediately obvious. How does a self become authorized outside of
communal boundaries? Can individuals authorize themselves if authority itself requires a
community of referents? From Seligman’s Durkheimian perspective, the idea of selfauthorization as a relation based in authority begins to weaken considerably.
Indeed, outside of community Seligman believes that authority cannot exist. It is the
structure of the community, the rules and laws, that give authority its shape: “It is, to complete
the circle, the subjugation of the individual wills to these sacred rules of order that defines
authority.”55 The idea that a self could obtain authority outside of a community is completely
contrary to the definition of authority I have outlined. To think that authority could exist in a
vacuum, and that it could be divvied out based on personal preference is inaccurate. To think that
authority could be a product of, and reside solely within, the individual self is incongruous with
authority itself. This is in direct contradiction of the authority that the nones give themselves,
however.
The idea of self-authorization, as far as it is conceived of by the nones and the
scholarship surrounding them, means that the spiritual but not religious draw on an authority
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from within themselves and that the self becomes the ultimate authority. The liberal notions of
individualism and individual autonomy are very prominent in this line of thinking. But these
notions are not in line with relations of authority. Authority, while deeply subjective, exists
because of something outside the individual. While we may live in liberal societies that value
individual autonomy over external authority, it does not make sense to say that authority has left
the institutional realm and entered the individual. Authority by its nature resides in rules and
laws that exist outside of individuals. Seligman goes so far as to say, “The most interesting
challenge to our own liberal preconceptions on this matter comes from the Durkheimian
perspective, which in essence holds not that community and authority are opposing principles of
social organization but rather that they are one and the same principle, as two sides of the same
coin.”56 Community and authority are inseparable, so it is not possible to speak of authority
outside of community. The self-authorization of the nones, however, occurs outside of
communal boundaries, leaving one to wonder if their self-authorization is based in authority at
all. These problems are only magnified when viewed in religious contexts.
Not only is self-authorization at odds with authority in general, but it is also at odds with
religious authority. Within the sociological tradition, when theorists discuss religious authority, it
is often done so within the context of the religious community. Durkheim is an excellent
example of this when he advocates for religion’s social reality.57 Even Weber’s famous analysis
of authority recognizes authority only within its social contexts. Indeed, charismatic, traditional,
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and legal authority all only occur within religious communities.58 The idea that one could gain
some sort of religious authority outside of the religious tradition itself is, for the most part, totally
foreign to the theories put forth by Weber and Durkheim.
But what about charismatic authority, what of the charisma of the prophet or grassroots
minister? What of one who begins their own religion? One might be tempted to argue that the
nones have some sort of charisma that grants them the authority to step outside traditional
religions. Charisma does in fact authorize the individual self in a manner similar to what we are
discussing here. Weber himself even recognizes the importance of the authority of the self in the
“personal call” in the life of a prophet in his Sociology of Religion.59 But when viewed in light of
the social realities of the nones, we see that this temptation is false. Unlike Weber’s prophets, the
nones do not come to found their own religions or radically change existing ones. When nones
leaves a church because of their own self-authorized convictions, they do not start a new religion
and they typically do not find new communities based on these convictions. They often only
become more secluded from society.60 The charismatic prophet, on the other hand, always has
disciples. They always form, and exist within, communities. Prophets also rely on some external
referent, outside of the self, to which they make their appeals and claims to authority. We see
here that religious authority, even the most individuating form of it, this being the charisma of
the prophet, is still firmly grounded within community.
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But what of religious virtuosi? One might also be tempted to think that the nones are
some sort of religious virtuosi, as Weber calls them. This form of religiosity is set apart from the
masses in that those who are part of this group are “differently qualified” in terms of religion. A
common example of a religious virtuoso is that of a monk. These virtuosos have in abundance
whatever a religion holds as a sacred value, such as the ascetic lifestyle of monastics. Also,
according to Weber, virtuosi draw on charisma, which would imply that they rely on some sort
of self-authorization as well. Perhaps some nones can be seen as simply more religiously
“musical,” to use Weber’s phrase, with certain insights that the rest of us do not have. Perhaps
they are not so far off from those monks and beguines of old that engaged in heresy.61 But, again,
this form of religiosity stands apart from the nones for the same reason we cannot view them as
prophets: religious virtuosi are still members of an organized religious community. If they are
self-authorized at all, this authority still comes from a fixed religious referent with a subsequent
religious community. Weber is clear that, much like prophets, virtuosi form communities or, as
he calls them, sects. Monks do not exist on their own but belong to a community of fellows in
monasteries. Furthermore, all of these only exist as products of a religious tradition itself. The
nones, by contrast, have no tradition or community. It would not make sense, then, to view them
in terms of Weber’s charisma or virtuosos.
Can authority exist outside of community? Moreover, can the self be authorized if it is
apart from a community? Can one solely rely on the convictions of the self to form their actions
and call this authority? The simple answer to this is no. This answer is even more true when we
look at these questions through the lens of religion. The prophet always forms a community,
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always relies on an external referent, and always gathers disciples. The authority of religious
groups, no matter their western or eastern origin, stems from their communal nature. In the same
way that Jesus Christ is not authoritative outside of his relation to God or his disciples, the
Buddha and his teachings are not authoritative outside of his proximity to nirvana or the sangha.
The nones, however, exist in no such community and rely on no external referent. They solely
rely on the dictates of the self. In terms of religion, there is no unified game or set of rules that
they all play by and thus no referent we might call “authoritative” aside from individual selves.
But when only the self and its desires are authoritative, it ceases to be an authority. For what is
self-interest if not an authorization of the self and its interests? And what is self-interest if not a
relation of power? Outside of a community, self-authorization only makes sense if it is viewed as
a power relation. And this would make perfect sense with our definition of the nones. We must
remember that the nones place themselves outside of all traditional forms of religious authority.
It makes sense, then, that the one defining factor of the nones, self-authorization, is incongruous
with traditional religious authority.

The Nones and Expertise
The nones, as a religious group, cannot be understood in terms of authority precisely
because they do not form or exist within religious communities, a crucial component in the
construction of authority. Because of this, it is better to understand the nones as a group that
empowers itself. This understanding necessitates that we turn to another way of understanding
the positive attributes of the nones that resides in the realm of power relations rather than those
of authority. The best way we can understand the nones in terms of power has to do with
expertise.
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This thesis introduces a new theoretical framework by viewing the nones through the lens
of expertise. To analyze them in this way, however, we must first show why it makes sense to
view the nones in terms of expertise. We have shown why it makes more sense to analyze the
nones in terms of power but there is still much we do not know about the source or locus of this
power. Scholars concerned with the nones typically locate power in the additive attributes of the
none identity and place it within such concepts as individualism or authentic self-expression.
These two approaches to locating the power of the nones are well worn paths in scholarship on
the topic. Figures such as Robert Bellah and Charles Taylor are prominent examples of
academics who have argued for these positions. But where Bellah and his colleagues would
argue that the nones are engaging in some sort of expressive individualism and Taylor would say
that the nones are simply looking for ways to be spiritually authentic, I believe that these
analyses are incomplete. There is something more epistemic going on.
Nones do not leave churches to be more authentic or because of individualism
simpliciter. Both are motivated by some sort of driving force. The nones leave organized religion
after encountering new knowledge about themselves and their religious communities. The nones
are motivated to leave religion based on what they know. Further, I believe that even those who
fall away from religion due to indifference do so based on their knowledge, knowledge being the
source of their indifference. It is not solely individualism or authenticity, but the thought of the
individual that has been empowered. An aloof parishioner knows that his or her priest is a
hypocrite and that the teachings have no weight in his daily life. An uninterested congregant
knows that the earth is not 6,000 years old. A teaching of an institution does not line up with
what an individual knows to be true about him or herself. Examples such as these motivate nones
to leave their congregations based on knowledge. To view the nones in terms of their thought
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and knowledge attributes an almost intellectual status to them, and I am not the first to notice
this. Linda Mercadante suggests “that the rise in nones is not simply greater individualism but
also a kind of loosely cohesive cultural or intellectual movement.”62 Indeed, her study found that
much of the reasons for nones leaving the church had to do with explicitly theological
disagreements, disagreements entirely centered around what one thought and knew about the
validity of certain claims and how these lined up with their thoughts about themselves. The
knowledge of the none, then, plays a larger role in the construction of the nones than many have
thought.
If knowledge is as critical to the construction of the none as I claim here, it makes perfect
sense why the rise of the nones has occurred in what many have called the “information age.”
Never before has knowledge been so weighty and so accessible to the broader public.
Knowledge that was once authorizing and safely placed behind institutional walls is now
available to the masses, allowing congregants to fact check their leaders from the pews.63 The
power of the nones, in part, comes from this ability to not only check the authoritative
knowledge of the pastor, and often dismantle it, but also the ability to now empower themselves
with new knowledge. If the only thing that separates me from my pastor is his knowledge on
matters pertaining to the divine, I no longer need him when I gain access to this knowledge. The
all too familiar picture here is of the one who uses Google to prove why this or that church
teaching is objectively false. Due to his or her access to knowledge, the individual effectively
becomes a pastor unto him or herself. Therefore, the nones are primarily an anticlerical group
rather than an antireligious one, as I mentioned in the introduction. While scholars who write on
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the nones are absolutely right when they argue that power has been given to the individual, this
does not go far enough. What exactly is empowering the individual? What part of the individual
has been empowered? It is precisely the knowledge of the none that is empowering them to leave
their churches and engage in autonomous spiritual seeking. Whether this knowledge is related to
the institution or the sense of self is not relevant to the current study. What is of importance is the
fact that the knowledge itself is empowering. This thesis will continue to analyze the nones using
this often-neglected view of the empowered individual.
The idea that knowledge can be a source of power is a common theme in scholarship
concerned with the subject, and one that was discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. Freidson and
Foucault have argued that power is located within knowledge. Foucault’s notion of
power/knowledge specifically illustrates the connection between gaining knowledge and gaining
power. One must remember, however, that this knowledge-based empowering borders on the
concept of expertise we defined previously. An empowered agent of knowledge, Freidson tells
us, can be viewed as a professional, technician, or expert.64 Much of the sociology of the
professions is in agreement on this fact. One who gains power through their knowledge often
times is regarded as an expert. This, paired with the knowledge’s ability to serve some sort of
function, would largely place the holder of such knowledge within the realm of expertise that we
have outlined. If it is true that the nones leave religious institutions due to their knowledge, then
it is at least plausible to view the nones as experts.
We must also not forget the fact that nonexperts gaining expert status is becoming more
prevalent as concepts like lay expertise become more mainstream. As we have previously
discussed, there are many ways in which lay people are being recognized as possessors of
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expertise. This phenomenon bolsters my argument for the nones being religious experts in that it
shows that contemporary currents of thought concerning expertise are willing to grant it to those
outside of specific institutions. When viewing the nones in relation to lay expertise, the argument
for the nones possessing expert status, despite their disaffiliation from religious institutions,
becomes clearer. At the very least, the notion of lay expertise makes it far more difficult for one
to counter my argument by claiming that the nones lack expertise because they did not go
through proper religious channels or institutions.
But what are nones experts in? We must remember that the empowering knowledge the
nones are supposedly gaining, the expertise they are accruing, is different from other forms of
expertise. The knowledge the nones are achieving is not something hard and factual such as the
expertise of the scientist or the doctor. Nor does it come from institutional sanctions such as the
expertise of scholars or lawyers. The nones are developing what we could call “religious
expertise.” But how should one go about defining a concept such as religious expertise? How is
it the same, and where does it differ from expertise in a general sense? As we have outlined
earlier, expertise is, for the most part, a product of specialized functional knowledge. If we want
to define the nones in terms of religious expertise, then we must first examine what religious
expertise is more traditionally, outside of the ways in which the nones use it. Furthermore, we
must examine the ways in which religious expertise adheres to the definitional attributes of
expertise more broadly. What is the specialized abstract knowledge of religious expertise? What
is the function of religious expertise? These questions must be answered before we examine the
ways in which religious expertise has been given to and acquired by the nones. Moreover, these
questions can only be answered if we examine traditional religious institutions and professionals
in terms of expertise.
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Religious Expertise and Religious Professionalism
A good definition of religious expertise comes from observing and listening to the
religious experts themselves. To do this, we must first discern who the religious experts are. We
can begin by claiming that religious experts and religious professionals are oftentimes the same.
As previously mentioned, the term expert is similar to the term professional. This qualifies our
search for religious experts in that where religious expertise might elude or evade analysis,
religious professionals are typically quite prominent. Following Weber, the sociology of religion
has often viewed two classes of people as professionals, priests and magicians. The magician is
distinct from the priest because magicians coerce the gods while priests facilitate their worship.65
Although the magician might have some expertise in magic, we cannot adequately call magicians
religious experts based on the fact that they are not located within religions themselves. Their
expertise, as one who achieves results for their clientele in a formulaic manner, would be more
akin to a mechanic or surgeon than that of a priest. This leaves us with the priesthood as the
dominant group of religious professionals, and the most obvious form of the priesthood on the
ground today is the clergy. In short, the religious professionals, the religious experts, are the
priests or clergy of any given religious tradition.66
Claiming that we can observe religious expertise or professionalism by looking to the
clergy, however, is a controversial claim. To do so runs us immediately into disagreement. Not
every scholar agrees that clergy are in fact professionals. Where prominent scholars such as
Weber and Abbott claim the clergy are professionals, indeed even the first profession, they do
not argue this point but rather attribute this status and move on without discussing how or why
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the clergy is indeed a profession. Because of the lack of thorough argument, some sociologists
now argue over the status of the clergy as professionals in general. It is important, then, to
answer the question of what makes a professional.
A common tool sociologists use while answering this question is a scale made by Richard
Hall, mentioned previously, that measures the professionalization of a group based on its
attitudes.67 This attitudinal scale measures professionalism in terms of (1) the use of the
professional organization as a major reference; (2) a belief in service to the public and the
professional’s claim that they can diagnose the problems to be solved better than the layman; (3)
a sense of calling to the field; (4) a belief in self-regulation; (5) the belief in the autonomy of the
professional.68 A study by Alan Bryman found that applying the scale laid out by Hall to the
clergy yielded two conflicting results. Either the scale is faulty and should not be used, or the
clergy are not a profession. While acknowledging his study cannot say for sure which finding is
correct, Bryman concludes that “there is undoubtedly a grain of truth in both contentions.”69
Similar findings were observed in a study by Thomas Gannon who had a less nuanced
conclusion. Gannon, using the same scale, concluded that the clergy, in and of themselves, were
not professionals but that they could gain professional status “through [their] occupation in
another, if allied, area.” He argues this by claiming that a “’Priest’ or ‘minister’ is above all
something one is, not something one does; thus an existential, not an essential, explanation is
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demanded.”70 We see from both of these studies that it is not at all clear how we should approach
religious experts and professionals. While some theorists tell us clergy are professionals but do
little to argue their points, recent scholarship argues the ambiguity and potential falsehood of
such claims. For this reason, we must locate a theory that can account for both positions.
Dean R. Hoge is a scholar who takes account of the same empirical approaches as
Bryman and Gannon while also appreciating the approaches of more traditional theorists. The
conclusion he comes to is that the “Clergy is a profession, yet a unique profession.”71 To Hoge,
the clergy fit many of the traditional attributes of professionals, but they are distinctive in crucial
ways. The two critical factors that separate the clergy from other professionals is that they have
different motivations for their work and a different source of expertise. The motivations of a
clergy person are not based in a desire to accumulate wealth or status, such as the professionals
who practice medicine or law. And even those in these professions who are motivated by other
desires, of which there are many, are differentiated from clergy in that the clergy are always only
religiously motivated. Furthermore, Hoge separates the type of expertise clergy members obtain
from typical sources, claiming that religious expertise comes from traditions and texts as
opposed to scientific data. Religious expertise is thus a unique form of expertise. These are the
two key differences between what we could call religious professionals and secular
professionals.
Hoge goes on to argue that in terms of professionalism it only makes sense to call
mainline Protestant clergy professionals because other protestant ministers often lack seminary
education and Catholics see the priesthood as a vocation. We will separate from Hoge here.
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Regardless of the lack of education or the squabbles around the word vocation versus profession,
all clergy members obtain some sort of expertise or else they would not be in their respective
pulpits. Even Independent Baptists recognize their preacher’s expertise in the performance of
preaching; they do not let just anyone speak on Sunday morning.72 For our purposes, then, all
clergy members have some level of religious professionalism and are thus partially religious
experts.
Having defined the priesthood or clergy as the religious experts, we must now observe
what these religious experts do. What is the function of the religious expert? To answer this
question, we can turn to Weber in The Sociology of Religion. He writes that the priesthood is
“the specialization of a particular group of persons in the continuous operation of a cultic
enterprise, permanently associated with particular norms, places and times, and related to
specific groups.”73 In other words, the priesthood consists of a group of people who are experts
in the performance of religious duties. Religions, as amalgamations of beliefs and rites, require a
specialized group of experts who can perform the rites and promote the beliefs of the religion
itself. To focus on the priest’s relation to rituals, for example, the expertise of the clergy is as one
who can administer and perform the rites for the lay masses. These performances are integral in
contributing to the ongoing life of the religion and the religious community. The priesthood can
be understood, in part, as a group that maintains a particular religious practice.
More than simply being a group of religious janitors, the priesthood is also perceived as
that group that provides the public with certain religious goods. In A Theory of Religion, Stark
and Bainbridge define religious specialists as “persons who specialize in producing and
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exchanging compensators of great generality based on supernatural assumptions.”74 These
“compensators” are seen as religious goods or services of which the priestly class provides the
public. These can be understood as the rites and beliefs that ensure certain supernatural
outcomes, and the priest as vendor of these is another primary function of their role.
Additionally, both Weber and Stark and Bainbridge include the notion of norms in their
definitions. Priests do not solely perform certain duties such as rituals and sacrifices, they also
promote and enforce particular standards on the members of the religion. Priests do not only
work in the realm of rites but also in the realm of beliefs. To think in line with Stark and
Bainbridge, priests do not only provide compensators in the form of, say, ritual cleansings. Right
belief is also a compensator in itself. Certain religious traditions demonstrate this, with
Christianity and sola fide being the primary example. Furthermore, the priesthood makes sure
that the beliefs surrounding the rites themselves are orthodox. The promotion of beliefs is still a
part of the maintenance of the cult and works in tandem with the administration of rites: right
belief promotes right practice and vice versa. As a group that enforces certain norms and
behaviors, it only makes sense that Weber argues that only the priesthood is capable of
producing a rationalization of belief and a religious ethic. But even the rationalization of belief
and a religious ethic are not ends in themselves for the priesthood. There is still a deeper function
this group serves. The purpose for all of that which the priesthood produces, according to Weber,
is “the cure of souls.” Weber writes, “The full development of both a metaphysical
rationalization and a religious ethic requires an independent and professionally trained
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priesthood, permanently occupied with the cult and with the practical problems involved in the
cure of souls.”75
We see from all of this that the proper function of the religious expert, according to these
authors, is to maintain the religion itself. That said, what it means to maintain a religion is quite
vague and needs further explanation. The most obvious ways in which the priest maintains the
religion is by being a functionary of practices, a promoter of orthodox belief, and a vendor of
certain religious goods. Priests do in fact have training in performing rites and promoting belief,
and both of these yield a strong religious community, but this is not the purpose of their
expertise. What this priestly care yields, what the proper end of religious expertise produces, is
the ability of the priesthood to help individuals achieve salvation, in whatever form it takes. And
salvation, as something that is exclusive to a transcendent or supernatural sphere, requires a
religious expert who can act as a professional intermediary between this realm and the natural
world. Stark and Bainbridge are quite clear that the real function of religious experts is to “act as
intermediaries between their clients and the alleged sources of the desired general rewards – the
gods.”76
The functionality of the expert, we must remember, is not the only aspect of our
definition of expertise. Experts must also be possessors of specialized knowledge; and if the
religious experts’ function is to be an intermediary between the human and the divine, we can
assume that their specialized knowledge contributes to this function. We can understand the
special knowledge of the religious expert in terms of the doctrines of their religion and their
religious ethics. Of course, every specific religious expert will possess unique knowledge that
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pertains to their specific religion. The knowledge of the rabbi about correct interpretations of the
Talmud is indeed very different from the expertise of the Ulama in Islamic law. That said, these
two religious experts are alike in that they both possess expert knowledge in some sort of
transcendent or supernatural reality. It only makes sense that the religious expert must be
knowledgeable in matters pertaining to the divine if they want to serve their function as
intermediaries well. And although religious experts certainly have a theological knowledge of
the divine, the ways in which the divine interacts with the world is often understood in terms of
ethics. It is implied by Weber that once a rationalization of ethics and taboos develops within a
religion, as a product of the priests themselves, it is the priests who are the possessors of the
sacred knowledge surrounding these. As such, the expert knowledge of the priests of a religion is
often within the realm of theological knowledge of the divine as well as ethical knowledge of the
way the world ought to be according to the divine. From knowing how certain ceremonies ought
to be performed to knowing how certain gods behave, religious expertise is located in theological
and ethical knowledge.
We can locate religious expertise in knowledge pertaining to the ethical dictates of a
religious practice. But we must keep in mind that the whole function of the priesthood as a
profession is to be intermediaries of the divine, and the knowledge possessed by a professional of
this class must be in line with the functional purpose of the priesthood as a whole. Thus, the
knowledge the religious expert possesses by way of knowing how things ought to be within the
religious practice is also ultimately for aiding religious adherents achieve salvation, in whatever
form this takes. If certain religious dictates mean damnation for a person or people, it is the job
of the priest to implore the laity to abstain from certain behaviors, actions, etc. Expert knowledge
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of religious ethics, how things ought to be, plays a crucial role in the function of the priest as
well.
In sum, priests function as ministers in the mediation of the divine and their abstract
specialized knowledge bolsters this function. Further, the priests, as a separated group of
religious elites, believe they can perform their function better than the laity. As a group set apart
from the rest of the population, they are the ones who are the best equipped and the most
effective at bringing salvation to individuals. Not only are they more effective than lay people in
saving souls but they also believe they are more equipped than other religious traditions at this
task. If priests are religious experts, these qualities are what define their expertise.
We must remember, however, that expertise and authority are different. But these
differences, like authority itself, are purely subjective. If I am operating under relations of
authority, the priest can bend my will to theirs simply based on their position and how I
subjectively view this position. If I view the priest as an authority, I do not have to be persuaded
of the importance of communion, for example. If I view the priest as an expert, however, it is the
knowledge and abilities of the priest, along with my lack of ability, that mandates my obedience.
We see here that religious authority is distinct from religious expertise, but this distinction is
only present on the subjective level. One can objectively be a religious expert and perform the
functions of the expert for one while subjectively be a religious authority to another. But our
assertion from the second chapter remains that within the mind of an individual a religious elite
cannot occupy both the place of the expert and the authority.
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Conclusion
While the beginning of our analysis saw many scholars deeming the religious nones a
self-authorizing religious group, I have shown why this language is problematic. To invoke
authority within a group that is incohesive by every metric is a mistake based on the fact that
authority is only present within social groups. Outside of the group, authority and social norms
cannot develop because individuals on their own can only act within the realm of power which,
as we have established previously, is strictly counter to the realm of authority. Unlike certain
groups of religious individuals that rely on particular forms of authority while seemingly
standing apart from community, such as Weber’s prophets or religious virtuosi, the nones exist
within, and form, no communities. They are totally outside the realm of a religious social order.
Because of this, we established that there is little reason to view the nones as group that
authorizes themselves in terms of religion: there is no foundation within this group on which
authority can rest.
Because the nones exist outside of religious communities, and thus abide by no authority,
we need to find another analytical lens through which to view this group. And because the nones
act as individuals and are thus confined to the realm of power and interest, we found that the best
way to understand the nones has to do with their self-empowerment. If we are to acknowledge
the nones as a disparate group of religious monads we must also acknowledge that they inhabit
the realm of power. As residents of this territory, I argued that it is more appropriate to view the
nones in terms of expertise as it is constructed on power relations. As such, we begin to see an
argument for the nones as religious experts taking shape. If the nones are experts, they must have
some sort of expert knowledge and function. I argued, on a very preliminary level, that the nones
possess some sort of knowledge that allows them to separate from traditional religions, that their
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separation is in large part a product of knowledge. The construction of a none, and the
deconstruction of religious institutions, is primarily epistemological on this reading. We can
assume, then, that this knowledge that is possessed by the nones contributes to their selfempowerment, to their expertise.
If we would like to claim that the nones are experts, however, we must also define their
expertise. To do this, we must first define religious expertise since this is the form that the nones
self-empowerment takes. We defined religious expertise based on what Weber called “priests” or
the clergy of any given religious tradition. By looking to these groups, we saw that religious
expertise is primarily constructed on two pillars. Firstly, the religious expert is functional. The
priest’s duty requires that they serve a religious community and perform certain rituals. The
primary end of this service is salvation or to act as an intermediary between the people and the
divine. Thus, the proper function of the priest is to mediate. In addition to having a function, it is
also important to note that the expert believes that they perform their function more effectively
than the laity. Having a function, and performing this function well, both construct the functional
elements of the expert. Secondly, the religious expert is a possessor of sacred knowledge. Priests
require certain knowledge to perform their function as intermediaries, and this knowledge
primarily takes form in both ethics and theology. The divine often enforces certain standards on
reality, and the priest as one who is close to the divine not only knows what these standards are
but also works to enforce them as well. Here we see that the two pillars on which religious
expertise stands reflect our findings in the second chapter: expertise is functional and requires
special knowledge for the performance of this function.
The argument of this thesis is that the nones are religious experts. With this chapter we
have further established buildings blocks, such as a definition of religious expertise, on which
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this argument can stand. That said, we are still far from concluding that the nones are indeed
religious experts. At this point, all of our key terms have been defined in themselves and within
religious contexts; the stage is now set for an examination of the nones as religious experts. In
order to do this, we must look to what the nones say about themselves and their beliefs, and
examine how these match up with the definitions we have outlined thus far. Only by examining
this group closely will we be able to adequately determine their expert status.
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THE NONES AS RELIGIOUS EXPERTS

The nones empower themselves in relation to religion. We have briefly discussed the
ways in which this empowerment is largely based on knowledge, on what the nones know. One
who is empowered by his or her knowledge is often times an expert. If the nones are indeed
empowered in such a way, perhaps they too are experts. Thus, it is worth examining the nones in
relation to religious expertise. While it might seem absurd to view the nones as experts, the
argument laid out in this paper thus far warrants attention and analysis. If the nones can be
viewed as religious experts, our understanding of this group and religion in the modern world
could be dramatically altered.
The purpose of this chapter is to utilize certain interviews, ethnographies, histories, and
research projects to observe what the nones say about themselves and see if this aligns with the
definition of religious expertise discussed in the last chapter. I have dedicated significant space
to outlining what religious expertise is so there is little reason to define it again here. What is
more pressing is to take what we know about religious expertise and examine the nones in light
of our definition. With this in mind, this chapter will largely analyze what I have called the two
pillars of religious expertise (functionality and special knowledge) in light of interviews and
survey data collected on the nones to see if there are not parallels between religious expertise and
this group.
For this analysis we will also be relying primarily on the sociology of expertise, as
opposed to the sociology of professions, along with the various forms of data mentioned above.
If we examine the nones from the perspective of expertise we open ourselves up to a couple
different analytical insights. Firstly, under the sociology of expertise we can view the expert
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status of the nones as not socially granted; that is, expertise is not something attributed to the
nones by a social group or institution. The idea that expertise is something that is socially
attributed is more in line with the sociology of professions, and we would have to view the nones
as professionals on this reading, which they are clearly not. Rather, I argue that the expertise of
the nones is closer to what some thinkers have called “knowhow” based on function. This is in
line with what Gil Eyal describes when writing, “[E]xpertise identifies practical knowhow
possessed by an individual by virtue of experience and long practice, rather than scholastic
knowledge and credentials.”77 This reading allows the nones, and religious expertise more
generally, to outmaneuver the need for institutional sanctions, educational background, etc.
which many nones clearly lack in relation to religion. With all of this in mind we may now begin
to analyze what the nones say about themselves in relation to what we have said about religious
expertise utilizing the two primary facets of religious expertise: special knowledge and expert
function.

Special Knowledge
We will begin by analyzing how the nones empower themselves through the knowledge
they possess. One who is empowered by his or her knowledge is often considered an expert.
Only the possessors of specialized knowledge may call themselves an expert; it is in part this
knowledge that raises them to their expert status. As we have previously discussed, the expert
simply knows more than the lay person. The subject of the knowledge, of course, is always
different (doctors have a very different library of knowledge than lawyers), but the character of
expert knowledge is for the most part the same. The character of special knowledge is often
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formal, meaning it has been “formalized into theories and other abstractions, on efforts at
systematic, reasoned explanation, and on justification of the facts and activities believed to
constitute the world.”78
In relation to religion and religious expertise, this thesis argues that the special
knowledge that a religious expert possesses has to do with theology and ethics. The religious
expert knows certain things about the divine in general, perhaps the behaviors or characteristics
of a particular god, while also knowing the ways in which the divine interacts with the world,
this being understood in terms of ethics. It is important to note here that the definition of
theology that will be used here will be exceedingly broad. What I mean by theology, in contrast
to many Western Christian notions, is any system of knowledge pertaining to a transcendent
reality. With this definition in mind, we see that the specific knowledge and practices among
different religious experts is obviously different in terms of subject matter (the Catholic priest
has an entirely different set of knowledge than the Buddhist monk) but a common characteristic
of the bodies of knowledge would certainly be a formal understanding of a transcendent reality
and how it affects, and should affect, the world. It is also important to note that the special
knowledge of religious experts is often localized either in sacred texts or holy people. If these
texts or figures can seclude themselves from the eyes of the lay masses, special religious
knowledge remains safely in the hands of elites.
Religious experts have access to a special knowledge through these texts and holy people,
and in many cultures this knowledge has historically been kept secret or hidden from the laity so
that only the elites could handle such precious information.79 A great western example of this is
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the fact that the vast majority of medieval Europe was not able to read or understand the Bible
due to it being written and spoken entirely in Latin. Only the religious experts could handle the
holy text. This has changed with modernity, however. Certain social shifts along with inventions
like the printing press and the internet have made the special knowledge of religious experts
more obtainable, and thus less special. Nowadays anyone who is curious not only has access to
the teachings of holy persons or the sacred texts themselves, but to the wide variety of
interpretations and commentaries on these traditions. The barriers between expert and lay have
weakened due to the fact that special religious knowledge is becoming more and more accessible
to the general public. Furthermore, the overabundance of information allows for pluralism to
emerge which in turn weakens any religion’s claim to truth. It is important to remember, then,
that groups like the nones have access to the very knowledge that qualifies certain religious
experts as experts while also having genuine grounds to make their own assertions as the
legitimacy of theology in general diminishes. Nothing is hidden or kept away from the public,
except perhaps through the often overly confusing, cryptic, or impenetrable language of highminded scholars. Knowledge has been democratized. For this reason, arguments that say the
nones cannot be religious experts due to lack of access to information are inadequate. The none,
as well as the general public, are only inhibited by what they are and are not willing to read about
religion.
So, the stage has been set. All of the cards, so to speak, are on the table. With the modern
inventions of the printing press, and eventually the internet, the public now has access to all of
the special knowledge of the religious experts. This now allows for genuine disagreement and
critique from the laity; lay people can now readily identify the intricacies of the assertions of
Culture of Secrecy in Japanese Religion, ed. Bernard Scheid and Mark Teeuwen (London:
Routledge, 2006), 1-34.
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their religions and legitimately disagree with them. One can now Google a certain theological
concept he or she has trouble with and immediately examine it in terms of its value. Furthermore,
one can now easily learn of an alternative belief system or worldview and readily oppose the one
he or she finds problematic. These disagreements, of course, are products of other
epistemological or moral sentiments that these individuals hold to be true. This reinforces my
earlier assertion that nones leave religious institutions for epistemic reasons, they leave based on
what they know. It is not surprising, then, that as the general population begins to know more
due to resources like the internet, the population of the nones also begins to increase.80 A key
insight we can gather from this observation, however, is that the problems the nones have with
religion primarily reside in the realm of thought. Nones often leave churches based on ideas or
beliefs they know or learn. While of course, some nones leave their religions due to legitimate
grievances the latter has caused them, there is research that points to the fact that many nones
leave due to disagreements in thought.
Linda Mercadante’s book Belief Without Borders illuminates that many of the nones are
indeed leaving religion due to differences in ideas and beliefs. Because survey data cannot
construct an adequate picture of a none’s worldview, little attention has been given to the
religious thought of nones outside of Mercadante’s work. For this reason, Mercadante decidedly
emphasizes theology and belief in her study and aims to have the nones themselves outline these
beliefs for her. Her study provides strong evidence that it is specifically the ideas that religions
demand of adherents that deter nones from affiliation: “Scholars who have studied the factor of
belief in disaffiliation have found it to be a significant factor. In fact, doubt often precedes
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disaffiliation.”81 Not only are many of the problems the nones see with religion conceptual and
ideological, they are also theological. It follows from this that there is some sort of theological
knowledge the nones possess that conflicts with certain theological doctrines of institutional
religions. She writes

Not everyone will automatically expect that theology could play a part in the
decline of religious participation, nor that theology could play a part in the
development of spirituality. Few assume that SBNRs are discarding religion for
specifically theological reasons. Yet in my conversations with SBNRs, I have
heard a theological substrate that could well justify their hesitation toward or
rejection of religious affiliation and their adoption of other practices.82

With this we begin to see a developing picture of what constructs a none, and we see that it has
much to do with knowledge of what could be called sacred or religious ideas. In the past, the
knowledge of these theological doctrines and ideas was strictly kept out of the public’s hands.
Now, however, the public has access to this knowledge, and some do not like what they learn.
Therefore, disaffiliation is, for the most part, an epistemological choice grounded in the realm of
ideas; one often leaves religious institutions based on what he or she knows about religious ideas.
Indeed, one can further the argument that nones are empowered to leave their institutions
based on their thoughts and ideas by looking to the histories that have been written about them.
While the group known as the nones or spiritual but not religious is a recent phenomenon, many
historians have argued that what we could call proto-nones have been at home in America for
quite some time. At the very least, there is an agreement that the lines of thought that lead one
down the path of disaffiliation have roots in America’s history. Two recent and significant
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histories of the nones are Leigh Eric Schmidt’s Restless Souls and Robert C. Fuller’s Spiritual
but Not Religious. Both book’s display in depth histories of the nones in America and argue that
they have been in residence here for quite some time. It is important to note, however, that these
books, which are prominent in scholarship on the topic, are histories of ideas. Both scholars rely
on currents in thought, from Emerson and the Transcendentalists to New Age philosophy and
alternative medicine, to make their case that the nones have in fact been a part of American
history since its inception. We learn from these scholars that the history of the nones is the
history of specific ideas. In terms of knowledge about special religious ideas, it would not only
seem that the modern day nones clearly possess some, according to Mercadante, but that their
progenitors possessed this knowledge as well.
So, we have established that nones indeed have access to some sort of special religious
knowledge. If they did not, how could their disaffiliation and history be entirely wrapped up in
the realm of ideas? We must now determine whether this knowledge has the same subject matter
as the special knowledge of religious expertise. I have argued that the knowledge of religious
expertise deals specifically with matters pertaining to what one deems divine (theological
knowledge) and how the divine interacts with the world (ethical knowledge), and if we turn back
to Mercadante we can see firstly that the nones clearly possess some sort of theological
knowledge. Mercadante shows that there is a theological understanding that motivates much of
the nones’ indifference or disdain for institutional religion: “Instead of a desertion of belief, we
hear the formulation of a new set of principles to guide practice and action.”83 We see here an
assertion of the ways in which nones are constructing theological beliefs for themselves. Another
scholarly work that allows the nones to speak for themselves on theological issues is Choosing
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Our Religion by Elizabeth Drescher. In this work Drescher quotes many of the nones she
interviewed and shows how they often make positive claims about theological issues. One of her
interviewees responded saying, “I mean, I do think there’s something, but I don’t know what it
is. I don’t think anyone can be sure, you know? No one can prove it. And I sure don’t think it
matters, you know, in terms of how most of the world works—like the government or
businesses.”84 Located within this answer are positive theological statements. Rather than taking
an apophatic stance towards theological questions, many of Drescher respondents were sure that
we cannot know anything related to the transcendent or divine. These respondents believe they
positively know things about the transcendent or divine even if it is simply that we cannot know
anything about it. This sentiment is shared by another respondent who replied, “As far as I’m
concerned, community is religion. Family is religion. All the rest of it – the doctrines and rituals
– I think those came about to help create tribes, communities, families, and so on.”85 Here again
we see an example of a none making a positive claim about religious knowledge, theological
concepts, and what they believe to be related to the divine. These are just two examples from a
book filled with respondent assertions of what they believe to be divine or spiritual, and what
they believe is clearly neither of these. One can assume that in order to make these claims, the
respondents must have some knowledge of their own to back it up and we see that knowledge on
display when nones make assertions about theological concepts. While the religious knowledge
of the nones is certainly not as articulate, rigorous, or historically grounded as that of systematic
theologians, when we look to interviews and ethnographies of the nones we begin to see a
positive theological framework. The nones too make assertions and have thoughts about what is
divine, spiritual, and transcendent. And while their supporting evidence is not as academic as
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theologians, the grounds on which they make these claims is seen as increasingly legitimate as
the authority of traditional theological knowledge continues to fade.
We also see that it is a none’s theological convictions that influence his or her ethical
frameworks as well. Indeed, it is often a nones ethical values that inhibit them from subscribing
to certain theological doctrines such as many nones’ moral objection to exclusivism.86 We have
discussed the ways in which a religious expert’s theological knowledge often informs their moral
judgements; an understanding of the divine requires an understanding of ethics. As religious
experts, we will see that this is also the case with the nones. Nancy Ammerman discusses what
she calls “Golden Rule Christianity” in order to outline a loose moral framework for certain
Christians. She uses this illustration, however, to point to the importance of ethics in people’s
spiritual lives. This importance of morality is maintained across the religion versus spirituality
dichotomy. When analyzing what she calls “theistic” (religiosity focused on the divine) and
“extra-theistic” (religiosity focused on naturalistic forms) spiritualities, Ammerman observes that
morality is a common link between both. She writes that “The one thing that almost everyone
agrees on, however, is that real spirituality is about living a virtuous life, one characterized by
helping others, transcending one’s own selfish interests to seek what is right.”87 Those without
institutional religion do in fact have a moral code by which they live, and this moral code plays a
role in their spirituality: “A moral focus is common in talk about spirituality across the religious
spectrum.”88 With the examples from these scholars we see not only that nones have a sense of
morality, but that this sense of morality is directly linked to their view of the divine in the same
way traditional religious expertise is. The way in which the nones view the divine directly
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influences their moral stance as well. For example, if nones exhibit a loose pantheism, they will
have a moral objection to exclusivism. Furthermore, we see that it is the nones’ sense of morality
or knowledge of ethics that empowers them to leave their religious institutions. Here again the
religious knowledge of the nones plays a key role in their empowerment.
The nones certainly have knowledge of religious ideas and their own thoughts about
theology and ethics. Furthermore, we see that it is their knowledge of such concepts that
empowers them to leave their religious institutions. As we have previously established, one who
is empowered by their knowledge is often times an expert. If it is true, then, that the nones are
empowered by their knowledge, and that this knowledge has to do with the same subject matter
as that of religious experts (theology and ethics), it only makes sense to assert that the nones
have achieved a level of religious expertise. But knowledge is not the only contributing factor to
expert status. A doctor becomes an expert in medicine not only because she learns a great deal of
information, but because she has a level of knowhow that allows her to practice medicine on the
sick and dying in an effective manner. Similarly, a religious expert must have a knowhow in the
matters that religious expertise deals with. We see here that the nones possess adequate
knowledge in these matters to make judgements based on their understanding of these issues.

Expert Function
Having analyzed how the nones empower themselves through their access and claims to
specific types of knowledge, we can now move on to the second key attribute of religious
expertise: functionality. One who simply possess a large quantity of knowledge is not necessarily
an expert. This knowledge must have a use or be functional in some sense. Up to this point one
could easily make the counterargument that anyone can know things about religion or make
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theological claims; doing so, however, does not make one a religious expert. Simply knowing
much about God, gods, or spirituality does not qualify one for expert status. This is indeed true.
If we were to rely on the field of medicine to provide another example, we might say that one
who simply knows a lot about the human body, diseases, or pharmaceuticals is not counted as a
doctor for the same reason. We are reminded with these examples that expertise relies on its
functionality for its construction and legitimacy. In terms of religious expertise, I have primarily
discussed this function in terms of an individual’s ability to mediate the divine. What we will see
as we continue our examination of the nones is that they too perform the function of religious
experts based on the previously discussed special religious knowledge they have obtained.
While it is not immediately obvious, the choice of becoming a none requires that the
nones believe they can perform the function of the religious expert. Furthermore, it necessitates
that they believe they can perform the function of the religious expert better than those clerical
bodies found within religious institutions. These two assertions are undeniable in light of the fact
that the act of leaving organized religion necessitates a confidence in one’s own ability to
perform the function of organized religion for oneself. With this in mind, we will return to the
interview-based studies of Drescher and Ammerman and see the ways in which the nones
mediate the divine for themselves through a variety of means.
Firstly, we will examine the ways in which the nones view their self-mediation of the
divine. Within the American zeitgeist there is what we might call a “do it yourself” mentality.
One can observe this mentality in certain popular trends such as DIY (do it yourself) crafts,
projects, and TV channels. This attitude, which is seen as a positive quality, is a clear product of
individualism and typically denotes, and promotes, one’s ability to perform certain tasks on their
own. Furthermore, this mindset coneys a certain posture towards expertise, or those who are
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trained in the task that the non-expert is performing. The “do it yourself” attitude hinders one
from seeking or asking for aid from those who could properly provide it. It is hardly surprising,
then, that many American nones exhibit this mindset towards their religiosity and spirituality.
The idea that they can determine for themselves what is spiritual, and that the seeking of this
spiritual substance is more effective when they are cut off from institutions, when they “do it
themselves”, is littered all throughout the interviews Drescher recounts in her ethnography. One
respondent, when discussing how he eventually left church, discusses his spiritual practices
outside of institutional religion. Instead of attending a service on Sunday morning this
interviewee stated, “I can take the dogs to the park or walk in the hills—either of which feel
more spiritual to me anyhow.”89 Here we see an instance of the “do it yourself” mentality. Rather
than prescribed religious activities, which were not proving effective, this respondent not only
chose something outside the norm, but deemed this alternative activity as more valuable.
Ethnographies of the spiritual practices of the nones are filled with examples like these.
Anything from reading, to soaking in a hot tub, to meditating on pictures of loved ones can be,
and often is, considered a spiritual practice.90 And the nones who observe these sorts of
alternative practices that they construct for themselves always say that they are more spiritual
than what they would get at a traditional religious institution. If they were not, they would still be
attending church.
In this sense the nones effectively mediate the transcendent for themselves. Every
ethnography or interview with a none will show that this is unequivocally the case. While, of
course, a Christian might not say that a none mediates God as effectively as an ordained pastor,
89

Drescher, Choosing Our Religion, 41.

90

These are activities interviewees listed as “spiritual” in the works of both Drescher and
Ammerman.
76

the nones are not Christians. What they view as God, gods, divine, or transcendent is
individually determined so to say that they cannot mediate the divine is rather an argument best
left to apologists and theologians. To argue against the nones mediation of the divine, then, is to
make an argument based on presupposed religious sentiments and this is not the job of sociology.
Those who decide for themselves what is divine and what is not shape their spiritual practices so
as to reflect and be in line with their religious views. If I view nature as transcendent, I do not
need to go to church but rather I need to spend time outdoors perhaps in quiet reflection or
meditation. There is, then, a symbiotic relationship between the views of the transcendent
(special knowledge) and the practices one performs in response to these views (mediation of
transcendent).
We also see here that the nones believe that they perform the function of the religious
expert more effectively than those in religious institutions. That said, unlike traditional religious
experts they do not claim an exclusivism or that everyone should observe the same practices as
them, but simply state something like “what I do works for me.” The language that the nones
often use in interviews connotes a sort of spiritual spectrum in terms of higher and lower
religious practices or values. The common statement that something “feels more spiritual to me
anyhow” alludes to this spectrum. While each none’s spiritual spectrum is different and
individually determined, they always place traditional religious practices somewhere lower in
value. This contrasts with traditionally religious people who would hold traditional religious
practices in high regard. This is done because the nones believe that what is placed in higher
regard on their spectrums is more spiritually meaningful. And this belief is judged and
legitimated based on the none’s knowledge of the divine. We see this attitude on display when
nones state
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I’m not interested in a program with, you know, an executive director and a staff
of twenty people. I’ll buy a homeless guy a sandwich, you know. I’ll mow an old
lady’s yard. I want to help people who really need help. I don’t know that, for me
or most people my age, “Christian” means that anymore. For me, saying I’m a
Jesus Follower or a None means I get to live as best I can as a disciple of Jesus
without taking on all the other stuff that pushes people away from his gospel.91

We see here an example of a none who is defining problems within institutional religion as well
as giving examples of ways in which his individual practices mediate the divine in a more
significant way. Therefore, just like the priest who holds certain religious beliefs and practices in
high regard based on his knowledge of the divine, the none holds a different set of beliefs in high
regard but justifies them in the same manner.
One will also notice, however, that the above quote has a deeply ethical undertone. If the
nones, as religious experts, can judge the merits of certain traditional religious beliefs they can
also come to their own conclusions about the nature of institutional religion itself. Like the
Christian pastor or apologist who acknowledges portions of other Abrahamic faiths as valuable
in light of Christianity, nones also acknowledge nuggets of truth from certain religions as
valuable. Therefore, they essentially judge what is worthwhile from traditional religion and what
is not based on their perception of the divine in the same way a religious expert would. This
behavior does not necessarily make them an expert, but it is certainly a behavior experts exhibit.
A commonality among most nones is that they deem much of the morals of traditional religious
institutions to be virtuous. There is often an agreement on “Golden Rule” morality, to borrow
from Ammerman, across the wide variety of nones which we have already observed. But this is
as far as the utility of these institutions goes, and if one believes that all religion is good for is
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morals and ethics, as many nones do, then there is little reason to keep attending services once
one “gets the gist.” There are many places where Drescher’s interviewees equate religious
institutions to schools of morality: “Religion is a social club. Church is moral finishing school.”92
Viewing institutional religion as a “moral finishing school”, a view shared by many of
Drescher’s respondents, means that one need not go to church any longer if they understand the
basic teachings they learn as children there: “It is not something I need as an adult.”93 If church
is essentially something one can graduate from, why stay once you have learned all there is to
know? It is important to note that here again we see the nones performing the function of experts
for themselves. Through their individual mediation of the divine they deem certain parts of
institutional religion worthwhile; but this valuation of morality is again only based on their
mediation of what they see as transcendent. Like the previous example, if I view nature as
transcendent, those aspects of world religions that promote love of nature are going to be higher
on my spiritual spectrum than those that promote human dominion over nature. The morals of
traditional religion are only valuable insofar as the divinity the none ascribes to promotes them.
But they must firstly be mediators of this divinity if they are to know what is to be praised or
condemned.
The nones, then, perform the function of the religious expert and believe that they
perform this function better than the religious experts themselves. And as we have seen even
those who profess no belief in the transcendent mediate this absence by removing themselves
from religion and spiritual practices. One who uses their special knowledge to perform a task is
often an expert, and here we see that the nones are using their religious knowledge to mediate the
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divine for themselves. Thus, it would seemingly make sense to grant them the status of religious
expert.

Conclusion
There are many criteria we outlined for expertise at the beginning of this study. We
narrowed down these criteria when we looked specifically at religious expertise, which is unique
from other professions such as medicine or law. The specific criteria for religious expertise we
came to, based on the sociologies of Max Weber, Rodney Stark, and William Sims Bainbridge,
rested on two primary measures. The religious expert, something similar to what Weber would
call a priest, is one who has a degree of special religious knowledge and is able to use this
knowledge in the function of achieving salvation for souls, mediating the divine. If I want to
make the case that the nones are religious experts, I must show that the nones exhibit both of
these qualities. I have attempted to do so here.
By looking to ethnographies, histories, and interviews with the nones we were able to see
that they do in fact possess the qualities of religious experts. Nones, along with the general
public, have access to all of the religious knowledge throughout history one could want. Thanks
to the internet, special religious knowledge is open to the public. What differentiates the nones
from the general masses of religious people, however, is that they use this religious knowledge to
ground the rejection of institutional religion. Furthermore, nones also use this religious
knowledge to inform their morals and ethics in the same way that religious experts do. If the
divine condemns something, the religion condemns it. This is true whether this religion is
communal or individual. The nones also perform the function of religious experts in that they
mediate the divine for themselves. This is seen not only in the very act of leaving church to
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pursue other spiritual activities, but also by the fact that these other spiritual activities are
deemed more effective. Most nones do not only leave church simpliciter, but also posit that what
they do instead is “more spiritual” and thus more meaningful. The only difference here between
nones and traditionally religious people is that the latter have an agreement on what the divine is
and the former are extremely internally diverse as far as what they deem divine.
By utilizing the sociology of religion, we have developed a definition of religious
expertise. When comparing the nones to this definition I hope to have proved that they do have
the same qualities as religious experts and are thus worthy of expert status. Every quality that the
sociology of religion has given us for expert status is in line with calling the nones experts or
specialists. To use Weber’s term, the nones are essentially priests of cults with populations of
one.
Many will still disagree with this assertion, however, and claim that the nones do not
belong within the realm of expertise because they lack something like training, institutional
backing, etc. These criteria, however, all belong to the sociology of professions. And while we
have equated professionalism with expertise it is important to remember Dean R. Hoge and that
religious expertise is unique among the other professions. Examining the distinctiveness of
religious expertise, along with the shifts in religion from early modernity to the present, will
illustrate how religious expertise can outmaneuver certain sanctions such as training or
institutional endorsement for expert status. As such, we will analyze these in the following
chapter.
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RELIGIOUS EXPERTISE AND MODERNITY

Up to this point I have shown that the nones themselves must function within relations of
power given the fact that they exist outside of religious communities, so it makes sense to view
them in terms of expertise rather than self-authorization. And I have even argued for the nones as
a group of religious experts. But there is a missing link here. How did the nones become
religious experts? Is this even possible? What has allowed religious authority to become so
unstable as to allow the laity to become experts? What has occurred within religion that has
weakened its claim to authority so much so that its power is now obtainable even by those totally
outside of religious institutions? If the nones are religious experts, as I claim they are, we must
now justify this claim by answering the question of what has allowed the nones to gain this
expert status.
I have shown that the nones can reasonably be likened to religious experts for reasons
primarily having to do with their ability to mediate the divine for themselves in terms of
knowledge and function. But there are obviously problems with this argument in its current form.
The understandable rebuttal to my claim is that I have focused entirely on behavior. Sure, anyone
can behave like an expert, but this behavior does not warrant expert status. In short, the counter
argument could still be made that the nones are not religious experts because they lack
articulation, degree of knowledge, or some other quality. I previously claimed that religious
experts are members of the clergy, and clearly the nones are not members of this group. None of
the ways in which we typically identify religious experts can be applied to the nones; they do not
even reside within religious institutions so how can they be experts? These refutations would no
doubt also include the myriad ways in which certain traditional religious experts are indeed
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different from the nones: they require formal training, must be educated in certain institutions,
etc. As I have shown in previous chapters, there are structures in place that keep expertise out of
lay hands. It is not a characteristic of expert status that it is easily obtainable by run-of-the-mill
people. Let alone obtainable by those totally outside the specific institutions the expertise
constructs. How then has religious expertise seemingly been distributed to those who are outside
of the traditional systems that empower experts, as I claim it has? How is this distribution of
expertise possible? I argue here that it primarily has to do with a new location and source of
religion. The nature of religion has changed.
An argument for the nones’ status as religious experts must examine the counterclaims
outlined above and refute them if it is to be successful. Upon examining these assertions, it is
important to realize that there are important facets of this rebuttal that require critique, the most
prominent of which is the counterargument that religious expertise requires credentials that exist
outside of oneself. But history continually proves that religious experts require no credentials
outside of their charisma and personal religious fervor. The counterargument outlined above
assumes that religious expertise is static, that it always requires certain qualities or attributes. But
religion is dynamic, and we increasingly see that old classifications no longer encapsulate all that
religion claims to be in the present moment. The mark for what defines religion is constantly
changing, so how can one claim that the measure of religious expertise always remains the same?
In sum, if religion changes and shifts, as we will prove it does, then religious expertise must
change and shift with it. By looking at the ways in which religion has morphed into something
new in modern times we will observe transformations in religious expertise that bolster the claim
that the nones can indeed be classified as religious experts.
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The primary argument of this chapter is that religion itself has taken on a new shape in
the era that has followed modernity. This is not a difficult claim to make as scholars for some
time have discussed the changing religious sentiments of the modern moment. The results of this
new shape, however, lead to important insights concerning a discussion of the nones. The
relevant claim for this chapter is that religious expertise has also taken on a new shape in order to
match the changes in religion. Moreover, this shift accounts for why religious expertise is so
easily obtainable. If the previous chapter demonstrated that the nones are religious experts, the
current chapter is an argument for how this is possible.
The most important way in which religion shifted after the arrival of modernity is that it
retreated into the private sphere. With the products of modernity dominating the minds of
moderns, it becomes impossible for any one religion to govern the public realm. Liberalism,
globalization, and pluralization work in tandem to confuse traditional religious authorities and
weaken their claim to public influence. As such, religion turns inward towards the self. If
religion can no longer govern the exterior world, its reign moves only into the life of the
individual. The self becomes the new location and source of religion in one’s life and community
begins to lose its importance. Thus, religious expertise no longer has to be found outside of
oneself but can be located and cultivated within. Where religion used to be traced to public
institutions, it is now found in the self. Similarly, where religious expertise used to be housed in
the walls of cathedrals and steeples, it now belongs to the individual. This confuses institutional
religion as a moral community, and weakens its claims to authority. With religion being so
heavily influenced by individual motivations rather than communal ones, religious expertise
becomes distributable to anyone who would like to claim it. In this chapter I will explore the
ways in which religion has transformed from a public phenomenon to a private matter, as well as
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show the ways in which this metamorphosis changes religious expertise. This transformation of
religion accounts for the distribution of religious expertise, and thus accounts for the nones as a
new and developing group of religious experts.

The Transformation of Religion
To claim that any religious faith has been consistent since its inception is a very difficult
assertion to defend. The wealth of Christian denominations alone is evidence enough of the
many disputes between church leaders about theological issues. Using the general example of the
Christian faith, then, we see that it is common for religions to shift and change with time. Keep
in mind that I am not trying to argue that these shifts and changes are radical or that they entirely
change the faiths from which they originate, just that they do often exist within them. These
shifts and changes are exacerbated by what I have previously called the products of modernity.
While premodern religion did have what we could call petty doctrinal squabbles, liberalism,
globalization, and pluralism introduce more exaggerated change that occurs at a quickened pace.
Peter Berger is right when he argues that “in [the modern] situation it becomes increasingly
difficult to maintain the religious traditions as unchanging verity.”94 As societies modernize
religions begin to adapt in ways that are potentially more noticeable and radical than premodern
times. We will examine some of these adaptations below.
As we have stated previously, the most significant shift in religion in the last five hundred
years or so is its move from the public to the private realm. In order to analyze this, however, we
must contrast private religion with how it functioned in a public sense. Charles Taylor and Peter
Berger give their readers a good sense of the ways in which religion functioned as a public
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actuality in their books A Secular Age and The Sacred Canopy respectively. For Berger, religion
constructs the social realities that people inhabit. In similar language, Taylor discusses religious
construal’s that reside not only in individual perception but also in places that are not entirely
conscious or recognized. To both scholars, religion orders and structures the world of premodern
civilizations in known and hidden ways. Indeed, at this time “society itself was understood as
something grounded in a higher reality; earthly kingdoms were grounded in a heavenly
kingdom.”95 In the same way that religion was embedded in the way people thought of or
“construed” the world, religion was part of the very fabric of public life. If the society as a whole
understood itself to be part of some greater heavenly kingdom, then of course religion would
dominate the way in which this people function. At the core of all these premodern civilizations,
these authors argue, was a religious heart, and all of reality was interpreted through this
particular religion. This changes, however, when modernity introduces new ways of viewing the
world.
As we have seen, religion used to occupy the core of social consciousness. It was
embedded into the fabric of society and all of reality was interpreted through this central
principal. This changes, however, with the advent of modernity. While we cannot get into all of
the specifics of how this change came about here, the most relevant issue for our purposes is the
consequence modernity has on the premodern line of thinking.96 The primary consequence of
concern for this study is secularization. While there has been much dispute over secularization
and what it means, I am not proposing here the idea that religion will eventually die out, as so
many before have claimed under the banner of secularization. Rather, I am using the term to
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point to the fact that the core of modern societies has been fractured. Karel Dobbelaere writes,
“The sociological explanation of secularization starts with the process of functional
differentiation: religion becomes a subsystem alongside other subsystems. In fact, secularization
is only the consequence of the general process of functional differentiation in the religious
subsystem.”97 It is this differentiation that is essential to secularization. Where religion used to
occupy the most prominent position within social structures, this position is now expanded and
occupied by many other bodies. It is not that religion has “lost the battle” to economics or
science per se, but these other subsystems now have a seat at the table equal to the seat religion
used occupy. The core of society is fractured, and this differentiation confuses the power and
authority religion used to command over the social structure, and consequently reality. As such,
religion no longer defines all of reality because some portions of the social structure are
relegated to other subsystems. For this reason, religion retreats to the level of the individual.
Berger tells us that religion, by being placed on equal ground with other subsystems, becomes
“de-objectivated” and loses the structures that reinforce religious belief: “there are always all
those others that refuse to confirm the religious world in question.”98 The only move religion can
make in this situation is to “subjectivize” itself. It is only in the realm of the subjective that
religion can now reside and dominate as it used to over the public, over the objective. Berger
writes that religion’s “‘reality’ becomes a private affair of individuals, that is, loses the quality of
self-evident intersubjective plausibility – thus one ‘cannot really talk’ about religion anymore.
And their ‘reality,’ insofar as it is still maintained by the individual, is apprehended as being
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rooted within the consciousness of the individual.”99 After modernity, it is clear from Berger,
there is nowhere else for religion to go. As an all-encompassing worldview, religion must
abandon the public realm and shift to the individual subjective level if it is to continue to survive
after the differentiating and pluralizing effects of modernity on social consciousness. This shift,
and subsequently religion being seen as a private affair, is recognized by not only Berger, but by
most scholarship on the issue.
It is important to recognize here that there are others who might refute certain claims
about religion in public life such as José Casanova.100 These refutations would point to the fact
that religion still holds an immense influence over the public realm, so it does not make sense to
simply say that religion is no longer present there. And of course, this response would be correct.
Modernity has still seen religion play an extremely active role in public life and discourse, as
Casanova rightly and accurately shows. But it is important to recognize the motivations behind
religion’s role in the public square, what is driving religion into the public sphere. Berger’s
assertion of religion’s retreat into the private still holds against Casanova’s analysis because
there is no way Casanova can disprove the individual motivations of religious adherents.
Furthermore, Casanova cannot adequately convince readers that religion still occupies its
premodern prominence within modern social structures. Sure, religion is active in the public
realm, but this is categorically different from the premodern social activity of religion; religion
can be seen in public, but it is no longer objective reality. In modernity, religion is active in
public life insofar as religious individuals make it so. The public, as an amalgamation of
individuals, is influenced by religion, but religion still only holds sway on the individual level.
Religion plays a role in public life as a product of religious individuals, but these individuals
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cannot reconstruct the religious realities of the past. Therefore, to say that religion has not shifted
to the private sphere because it is still active in the public realm does nothing to disprove the
religious shift itself.
This shift, many scholars would agree, began with the Protestant Reformation. And
while not all scholars would agree on the individualizing and secularizing influences the
Reformation had on the west, enough work has been done by scholars like Brad S. Gregory to
show that the Reformation did indeed have some unintended consequences.101 That said, to
observe the changing shape of religion historically beginning all the way back at the Reformation
would be a daunting task, and one that would be too large for me to attempt here. But for the
purposes of this argument, it is still important that there is at least some discussion of how
religious sentiments have changed since the pre-Reformation era. For this reason, I will be
examining developments in religious thought from the late nineteenth century up to the present
within the American context using broad strokes. Because the nones are a predominantly modern
American phenomenon, the timeframe and setting are the most appropriate for charting a change
in religious sentiment across America’s history.
According to Nathan O. Hatch in The Democratization of American Christianity, one of
the most important events that shaped America’s religious trajectory was the Revolutionary
War.102 This event came at the end of the Enlightenment and was fueled by many of the ideas
this intellectual movement put forward. Robert C. Fuller writes that “the Age of Reason instilled
confidence in every person’s potential for greater understanding, hope for the continued moral
progress of the human race, and an inspiring vision that we are all sons and daughters of a
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rational, progressive deity.”103 These ideas, along with the general liberalism that was developing
at this time, energized the American revolt and eventual victory. Once America was freed from
its oppressors, however, these ideas did not dissipate. The ideas that drove Americans to
revolution took root in the cultural ethos in a profound and lasting manner.
The American victory inspired the common people. The triumph over the British was the
ultimate validation that everyday citizens were just as capable of running their own country,
forming their own institutions, and organizing their religions as the elites were. Hatch tells us
that “the Revolution dramatically expanded the circle of people who considered themselves
capable of thinking for themselves about issues of freedom, equality, sovereignty, and
representation.”104 This event not only had an impact on the ways in which Americans would
choose to govern themselves, but it also had an impact on the ways in which they conducted their
religious lives. The spirit of democracy was so fervent that it crept into the Christianity of early
America, causing American religion to become less about “the specifics of polity and
governance and more [about] the incarnation of the church in popular culture.”105 As the nation
became more democratic, so too did Christianity: religion became popular. And as the church
became a church “of the people,” we began to see religion taking on a new shape. Enlightenment
liberalism and the American victory over the British influenced Americans towards a selfconfidence that was not present before these events. This self-confidence, when it came in
contact with religion, entailed leaders relying less on external institutions for guidance and
credibility, and more on personal inclinations guided by the supernatural. While “individual
religion” as something distinct from organized religion was not fully formed at this time (all of
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these self-confident American’s still held to their Christian identity), the years following the
Revolution displayed the beginning of a line of thinking in American religion that advocated for
one’s reliance and trust in one’s own intuitions over against institutions. Religion became more
accessible to the common people, but it is only made so because of a high emphasis on
individual autonomy. Thus, religion began its move from public to individual.
These religious sentiments continued to have a strong hold on American life long after
the Revolution. Plenty of thinkers in American history have advocated for the importance of
individual sovereignty as it relates to religion, one of the most prominent being William James,
who advocated for the study of religion entirely from an individual perspective as opposed to a
social or communal outlook.106 That said, the American populace, while still holding tight to
self-confident individualism, for the most part continued to identify with traditional religions,
i.e., Christianity. Another watershed moment in America’s religious history occurred in the
1960’s, and the events of this decade inspired religious Americans to not only trust in themselves
but expanded their choices of traditions to identify with. If the nineteenth century emphasized
individual self-confidence, the 1960’s emphasized and expanded individual choice. Wade Clark
Roof writes, “The 1960s were an era of expanding horizons,” and while many of these horizons
had to do with changing social norms, they also influenced religious norms. In Roof’s analysis of
the baby boomers and their children, he identifies choice as the crucial component of their
religious lives:

Many within this generation who dropped out of churches and synagogues years
ago are now shopping around for a congregation. They move freely in and out,
across religious boundaries; many combine elements from various traditions to
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create their own personal, tailor-made meaning systems. Choice, so much a part
of life for this generation, now expresses itself in dynamic and fluid religious
styles.107

It is important to see here that Roof is not only discussing choice as it relates to what belief
systems to ascribe to, but also choice in terms of what elements of a belief system one will use
for their own spiritual lives. Influenced by American individualism and self-confidence,
individuals can now enter into and leave religious institutions as individuals, picking and
choosing what is meaningful for them and leaving the rest. This line of thinking promotes an
approach to religion that was not entirely present before the 1960’s in the broader American
populace. Religion becomes so individualized that it is now possible to attend a Christian church
without being a Christian. What has become primary is the individual and his or her own belief
system. Of course, traditional religions influence these belief systems, but the tradition itself
becomes less of a foundation for life and more of a tool for individual spirituality. Here again we
see the shape of religion changing along with religious sentiments in America leaning more in
favor of “individual religion.”
With this history in mind, it is hardly surprising that religion in 21st century America is
almost completely individualized. It is in the wake of the 1960’s and the baby boomers that we
see the first big emphasis on “spirituality” over against “religion” in America. When one views
religion as a tool for constructing individual spiritual belief systems, the importance of the
religious community is displaced yet again. With this we see that religious thought has moved so
far away from the public religions of premodernity that it is not only being viewed as separate
from the entire public realm but that even the church in the private sphere has become too
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suffocating. Religion is now seen by many as so individually motivated that it has started to be
thought of as totally distinct from community in general. For many, religion has left the building.
Religion has not only been pushed out of the public realm in terms of its objective truth,
but is slowly being pushed out of religious institutions as well, to the point that religion is hardly
being seen as a communal practice at all. From these brief examples we see that Philip Rieff is
correct when he writes, “The best spirits of the twentieth century have thus expressed their
conviction that the original innocence, which to earlier periods was a sinful conceit, the new
center, which can be held even as communities disintegrate, is the self.”108 Church and state have
been separated, making religion independent and private; but now we see there is also a
separation of church and religion, or more accurately, church and spirituality. No longer are
private institutions good enough. It is only the self which can facilitate religious life and practice.
It is only within the self where “true religion” can be located and can flourish. With reference to
America’s religious history, we see that the movement of religion from public to private is so
complete that it has drawn completely into the individual self. By observing this movement, we
observe the changing nature of religion. What was objective reality now dwells only in the self.

Religious Expertise and Individual Religion
From this brief historical analysis, we begin to see that the nature of religion has certainly
changed. Interestingly there has been a steady move of religion from not only the public realm,
but also from the private realm. After modernity, religion can no longer construct and maintain
the fabric of social life. It can no longer be the core of social consciousness. For this reason,
religion moves into the private sphere. Church and state are separated, and religion is now one
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among many institutions that occupies this core of the social imagination. But even here we see
that individualism is so prominent that religion is leaving the private sphere as well. Not even the
private religious institutions have a claim to all that religion claims to be in the present day.
Religion is becoming, for many, entirely individual. This “individual religion,” or what many
call spirituality, is that religion which is so predominant in groups like the nones.
It is clear, then, that religion has changed shape since its premodern form. And if religion
is changing, so too must religious expertise. This would mean that modern day forms of religious
expertise would reflect the move towards individual religion we have just charted. In the same
way that religion has left institutions for many, so too would religious expertise. Religious
experts would no longer have to be only those who institutions sanction or ordain, but also those
who individually determine something like a calling for themselves. Here we also begin to see
why religious expertise is so unique. Among all of the professions, the professional bodies
associated with religion have the most nuance and malleability. And this flexibility is a direct
consequence of religion itself being so dynamic in the years following modernity. Dean R. Hoge
was indeed correct when he claimed that “the clergy is a profession, but a unique profession.”
If we would like to see a change in religious expertise in response to the dramatic change
in religion we have just plotted, we could look to the religious experts at each point in time from
our previous examples to see if they reflect the modern American emphasis on the individual.
Furthermore, we would be able to notice the forms in which this emphasis on individual feeling
was taking shape within religious expertise itself. It is important to note here that while I will be
charting certain changes in religious expertise, these changes are not the same across all religions
or denominations. Of course, conservative religious traditions like Catholicism or Orthodox
Judaism will maintain their traditional standards for expert status. What I am attempting to show
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here, however, is that the occurrence of a change within any religious tradition’s view of
religious expertise at all points towards a path of expert status being easily obtainable by the
laity. While yes, a degree from an Ivy League school has more merit for many, one can still get a
degree online from a school with a shoddy reputation. Often-times one even gets this degree for
less time and energy. Qualifications for education are thus pluralized, and the Harvard graduate
has essentially the same credentials as anyone else. In the same way, there are still going to be
religious institutions that require much of their experts, but this does not detract from the fact
that there is a growing number of religious groups that require little to obtain expert status and
that this pluralizes religious expertise. It is the fact that a change is occurring at all that is
relevant, not that it is occurring across the board.
If we were to return to Hatch, we would see that as a product of their revolution and the
popular notions of sovereignty and liberty, Americans began to change the way they viewed their
religious experts. Hatch identifies three key characteristics of early American Christianity:
rejection of traditional authority, empowering the religious feelings of ordinary people, and
religious outsiders being bold in their claims to authority. It goes without saying that all of these
examples have a clear connection to our discussion of the nones thus far. We see here that in
terms of expertise and laity, the playing field is leveling dramatically. Hatch writes,

They denied the age-old distinction that set the clergy apart as a separate order of
men, and they refused to defer to learned theologians and traditional orthodoxies .
. . these movements empowered ordinary people by taking their deepest spiritual
impulses at face value rather than subjecting them to the scrutiny of orthodox
doctrine and the frowns of respectable clergymen.109
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The revolutionary fervor of this time empowered the common people. Hatch’s book is filled with
episodes in early American history where religious passions, influenced by individualism, won
out over expert knowledge. To early Americans, religious experts, despite all their authority,
training, and knowledge, were no longer set apart from common people. Furthermore, the weight
that traditional theological learning once carried was waning. It was no longer important what
the church had authoritatively commanded about certain doctrines. What was now of prime
importance were the thoughts and feelings of the people despite expert opinion. And the
common people of this time viewed themselves in such high regard, riding the highs of the
Revolution, that they clearly believed they had adequate knowledge of religious matters and
could perform the function of religious experts for themselves. Orthodoxy and tradition begin to
diminish as the individual and her passions come to the fore. It is important to note, again, that
American religion still, for the most part, identified itself as a part of Christianity. That said, we
see here that religious expertise is falling out of repute among the people, and that the standard
for what makes a religious expert is beginning to decline.
This decline is consistent in American religion right up to the 1960s. And again, it is in
the sixties that we find another watershed moment for religious expertise. It is in this era and the
years following that we begin to see a distrust in American institutions. From the Vietnam War
to the Civil Rights movements there is an evident anti-institutionalism developing across
America, all of this culminating in the Watergate Scandal. It is important to remember that
institutions are primarily populated by experts. One could argue that it is the expertise that is
housed within institutions that gives them their power and authority over the public. Once one
becomes skeptical of institutions, however, everyone inside them becomes suspect as well.
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American religion is no exception to this. There has been a steady decline in trust of religious
institutions for some time and this decline has led to a general skepticism of religious experts
located within institutions.110 This can lead one to totally rejecting religious experts, as many did
after the Boston Globe ran its stories about the sexual abuse caused by Catholic priests, or totally
rejecting expertise.111 Jeff Todd Titon’s Powerhouse For God presents a good example of an
American church that not only does not hold to traditional orthodox teachings about religious
expertise, but actively resists more traditional forms of religious expertise that rely on training
and institutions. This church has pastors with no formal religious education preaching and
teaching on the Bible every Sunday, and these church leaders also condemn the more traditional
Methodists down the road. After 1960 one sees a loss of trust in institutions caused a noticeable
decline in the mark of, and respect for, religious expertise.
This brings us to the present situation in which a third of the American population
identifies as religious nones. And it is only in recent years that we begin to see religion’s
amputation from institutions altogether. Before this, those who relied on the self for their
religious qualifications were still largely under the Christian banner. Now, however, we see that
many of those who practice individual religion do so outside the bounds of churches. If
contemporary religious sentiments are placing true religion outside the walls of institutions,
where does that leave religious expertise? The only logical conclusion is that expertise too must
exit the institutions. With the growth of the nones we see the total separation of religion from
institutions. If true religion is found only within the self, only the individual can determine
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expertise. Anyone can be an expert, and the standards for religious expertise are all but
eliminated.
Having briefly analyzed religious expertise through certain currents in religious thought
we can see that the standards for expert status have been increasingly lowering. If we were to
examine the requirement of religious experts from premodern times, primarily Catholic priests,
and compare them to their charismatic counterparts, there would be a stark contrast in terms of
conditions that need to be met in order for one to mediate the divine properly. There is no
comparing the empowered charismatic inclinations of Pentecostal preachers and the careful of
study of authoritative church teachings by the Catholic priests. And these two are even within the
same religious tradition. It is obvious that the shape of religion changed within the last five
hundred years, but I believe it is also obvious that the shape of religious expertise has been
changing as well. And although certain traditional religions cling to their qualifications of
expertise, the promotion of lay people to expert status in the pulpit anywhere pluralizes and
confuses religious expertise everywhere. Thus, the fact that the standard has lowered at all points
to a general decline.
The decline in religious expertise has not been without its consequences. As I previously
mentioned, the differences in qualifications for expert status across religious boundary lines only
furthers the descent of religious expertise into oblivion. The pluralizing effect of different
communities promoting people to expert status based on disparate requirements diminishes the
value of these requirements. If certain groups require much of their experts while other groups
require little, people begin to get confused as to the legitimacy of the requirements in general for
constructing expertise. And if even the traditionally religious people cannot agree on how to
properly mediate the transcendent, one can only take it upon his or herself to serve this function.
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Theological education, which was once seen as the cornerstone of religious expertise, is
deteriorating to the point that some religious people no longer find it meaningful. I pointed to
examples previously of Christian denominations that do not require their leaders have an
education in theology, let alone those who shun traditional theological learning. And if not even
the religious people view theological learning as valuable, the relevancy of the discourse,
especially those authoritative voices within it, is going to diminish as well. The reputation of
academic theology is dwindling, so to say that a none is disqualified from expert status based on
lack of relevant theological knowledge is a nonstarter. What is “relevant” theological knowledge
if even certain religious people do not see a need for it?
An additional consequence of this decline is that expert status is being distributed
wholesale. We see this clearly when we look to the nones. Many take the confusion created by
the pluralizing effects of this decline in expertise and use it to empower themselves without
question. But even within religious institutions we see similar distributions of expertise. An
example of this is the popular notion of lived religion in religious studies scholarship. This
scholarly movement turns away from the pulpit, and what is being taught there, to examine
specifically the lay and how they think about their religious practices. By doing so, scholars who
subscribe to this movement have included the laity in discussion concerning the definition of
religion. No longer do only the learned religious experts get to define their practice. This is not
necessarily problematic on its face, but we can see how this academic movement is a product of
the wider decline of religious expertise. Academia’s empowering of congregants, who often
know little of their religious tradition, to make bold claims about the nature of their religion or
religion in general is clearly a result of the general decline of the standard for religious expertise.
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If one would still like to argue that the nones are not experts based on their lack of formal
training, this could be contested based on the views that lived religion puts forth. The idea of
lived religion,112 looking to the laity as the source of true religion, drastically changes what we
mean by special religious knowledge. If lived religion is now true religion, the laity too have
achieved a form of religious expertise. Meaning, the laity have achieved a degree of “religious
training” adequate enough for scholars to look to them for guidance on questions pertaining to
religious issues. If scholars are ready to qualify the laity in such a way, why would they refuse
the nones this status?

Conclusion
If religion changes, so too must religious expertise. I have attempted to show that the
shape of religion has transformed from its premodern structure primarily in the form of its retreat
from the public realm and its subjectivation within the individual. This change can be observed
not only in sociology but also in currents of theological thought. And with this change in religion
comes an inevitable change in religious expertise. In order to reflect religion’s now individual
character, religious expertise begins to morph into an individualistic phenomenon. This change
can also be charted through certain currents of religious thought though not as explicitly.
Religious expertise becomes individually determined, and the mark of expertise becomes based
on feelings, passions, etc. Because of this, the mark of what makes a religious expert becomes so
individually determined as to the point of meaninglessness. Religious expertise is pluralized, and
this confuses any and all claims to this status. In the wake of this confusion, we have the nones
emerging, and because religious expertise is in a state of anarchy, there are no agreed upon rules
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(aside from those laid out in Chapter 3) that say they cannot claim expert status. Thus, we can
see them emerging as religious experts in their own right.
It is indeed possible for the nones to be considered religious experts based on the current
state of religion in general. The reason religious expertise can now reside outside of institutions
is because religion has indeed left them for so many; for these people much of religion is now
seen as residing outside church walls. One sees this on clear display when they see the rapid
growth of groups like the nones and the prominence of individual religion even within the lives
of traditionally religious people. Individual religion does not define all of religion. There are
individualistic elements of certain religions, and some denominations have certainly taken more
to individualism than others, but these are exceptions rather than rules. Of course, there are still
requirements of religious experts across world religions and more traditional religions will
require more of their experts. And although pluralism might attempt to confuse these for some,
there are still many who believe that the requirements of expertise do authorize their religious
experts. But the nones, however, are not experts in Christianity or any other traditional religion.
Therefore, they do not have to receive the training traditional religious experts do. It would make
little sense to argue that the nones need formal Christian training, for example, to be considered
experts because the nones are not Christians. Furthermore, to say they need any traditional
religious training at all relegates them to a specific religion and cuts them off from all they see to
be spiritually significant. The nones belong to that new religion we have seen developing in the
years following modernity: individual religion or a religion of the self. In the same way that there
are religious experts across all religious boundary lines, there are also experts in individual
religion. But what does an expert in individual religion look like? Who are the priests of
individual religion? These would be the nones.
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CONCLUSION

Based on the argument presented in this thesis, I believe that the nones are indeed
religious experts. And while the nones being deemed experts might cause some scholars to think
more deeply about this group, others could certainly come away from this thesis thinking “so
what?” To claim that a new and developing religious group is made up of experts is not an earthshattering claim for the study of religion. But I believe this thesis sheds light on certain trends
and developments within religious life and the study of religion that are increasingly relevant for
the academic discipline. Throughout the work, I have alluded to the significance of expert status
within religious circles even outside the scope of the nones. The role of expertise within religion,
a topic that is largely neglected by scholarship, is becoming increasingly important for the very
reason that the nones are growing. I believe this thesis shows that the nones are not a sign of the
death of religion but rather point to shifting religious sentiments concerning religious authorities
and experts. To reiterate, the problems the nones pose do not have to do with the future of
religion in general, but with the future of the clergy. The key question posed by the nones does
not have to do with the death of religion, but rather asks how religion will function without
ministers. With this in mind, I would like to make a couple concluding remarks.
If the nones view themselves as experts, this necessitates that they recognize other
members of the clergy as competing experts as well. To see oneself in terms of religious
expertise requires that outside religious authorities be seen as experts rather than authorities.
Because this study has been primarily focused on the nones, I could not adequately discuss the
role of expertise within traditional religion. But it is worth questioning here, how many adherents
of traditional religion also view their clergy in terms of expertise? And if congregants of these
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religions view those in power as experts rather than authorities, what does that mean for religion?
Questions such as these show how relevant questions of expertise are to our current religious
landscape.
A final point I would like to make about expertise is the fact that its grounding in power
makes it inherently weak. We have previously discussed the objectivity of power in terms of
interest. If I want something, I am willing to bend my will or bend the will of others to get it. If
we view human nature solely in these rational choice terms, then all of human agency is more or
less objective. The only thing that the individual holds dear is the individual self and the interests
this posits. This view always puts one under relations of power rather than authority because
there is nothing that is subjective about my bending of will out of rational self-interest. But if we
understand human nature in these very rigid terms, we realize that power, and consequently
expertise, is actually very weak.
What if I am approached by my boss who tells me do this thing or I will be fired? The
power relation between my boss and I warrants that I do what they say based on coercion and
self-interest; I want to keep my job. But coercion lies on a spectrum much in the same way that
all power does. What if, at the same time, I am told by a person with a gun that if I do the task
laid out for me by my boss, they will kill me? If I operate solely in terms of self-interest, the
power of my boss quickly becomes obsolete to me because I do not want to die. We see here an
example of the inherent weakness of power. To use a common phrase, “there is always a bigger
fish.” If I navigate life solely in terms of self-interest, solely in terms of means-ends, power will
always be unstable. On this reading I have no beliefs and perform no actions based on moral
values I deem authoritative, the only “authority” in my life is my own interests which are
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constantly changing and evolving. If we were to view this in terms of expertise, we see a similar
problem.
The “crisis of expertise” that Eyal talks about is largely brought on by the fact that
experts are not viewed as authorities in the terms we have outlined here. Instead, they are viewed
in terms of power. Because of this expertise is not stable; it can always be challenged. If I go to
an expert and they give me bad news about climate change, for example, I can readily go to
another expert who will give me an opinion that is more in line with my interests. If self-interest
warrants who we turn to when we need expert guidance, we are left to our own devices to
determine who to listen to within a sea of experts on different subjects. If we even want to listen
to experts at all. In a hyper-individualistic culture, if it does not benefit my interests to listen to
the experts, why should I? All of this contributes to the fact that expertise grounded in power
relations, in interest calculus, is deeply unstable. I can always be coerced or persuaded to think
differently, if I even want to listen to the experts at all. If expertise were based in authority,
however, people would be more willing to listen when an expert scientist tells them they should
be recycling. If I view science as authoritative, I am grounded in my subjective moral values
about this subject and I believe its claims whole-heartedly. I do not have to be convinced or
coerced; I am listening to the scientists when they speak.
This obviously has deep implications for the clergy. If the authority of clerical bodies is
waning, for reasons having to do with science or secular culture, where else can they turn but
relying on power in the form of expertise. If people will not heed the advice of priests solely by
virtue of their positions, they must now argue their positions based on their knowledge and
ability to perform a function. The bending of the will is no longer subjective and just but argued
and rationalized. While I have not proved it here, I believe that many clerical bodies in the West
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increasingly rely on expertise rather than their authority as a result of societies becoming secular.
The invention and popularity of Christian apologetics is an excellent example of a religious body
relying on expertise as opposed to authority. I want to be clear; I do not believe that religious
bodies prefer to rely on expertise, or that all of them do, but I am not sure there are many other
ways to empower themselves in secular societies.
While I outlined the sociology of religion’s view of religious expertise, it is clear that
problems arise when we view religion in these terms. We must remember that expertise, as a
product of power relations, is inherently unstable. And I have shown previously how relations
built on authority are firmer than those that rely on power. Where authority commands
obedience, the powerful must coerce or persuade subjects to their will. Furthermore, unlike
relations of authority, the power relation is something that is negotiable, and these negotiations
typically have to do with self-interest. Indeed, I do not even have to listen to those in power if I
empower myself. This trend continues into a discussion of religious experts as opposed to
religious authorities.
Where religious authority typically acts as a barrier between clergy and lay, relations of
power begin to break this barrier down. In the same way that authority and expertise are
incongruous, we must remember that there is a difference between religious authorities and
religious experts. These differences, like authority itself, are purely subjective. If I am operating
under relations of authority, the priest can bend my will to his simply by virtue of his position
and how I subjectively view this position. Moreover, it is not the knowledge or function of the
priest in this case that separates them from the laity. It is solely the priest’s position as an
authoritative figure in a structure that the individual deems authoritative that keeps the sacred
knowledge and functions of the priest safely out of the hands of the lay masses. But when
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relations between priest and laity start to be seen in terms of power, these barriers that keep
authority in the hands of the religious elite break down.
When priests are viewed as experts rather than authorities, their positions as mediators of
the sacred becomes negotiable, like all other relations grounded in power. In fact, the sacred
itself even becomes negotiable. The negotiability of the priest and the sacred gives the selfinterested individual an immense amount of freedom while also making the authority structures
of religions unstable and even rejectable. Understanding religion in terms of power relations,
often grounded in self-interest, means that there is nothing grounding an individual to his or her
religious tradition, no moral values that establish authority, aside from interest relationships. This
means that religion becomes a means-ends relationship based in power, and whichever religion
achieves my most desired ends, whichever expert preforms their function the best, is the one I
will choose. To use Christian examples, if the Episcopalians are more effective at achieving
salvation, I will go to them for this. If the Assemblies of God are more effective at mediating the
divine, I will go to them for that. Thus, people move from institution to institution to determine
which one mediates the divine in the most appealing way, and phrases like “church shopping”
are born.
In the same way that experts in modern times are doubted, shirked off, and rejected by
individuals acting out of self-interest, religious expertise is in a similar situation. Unlike a
religious authority, one does not have to listen to certain religious experts if other religions
exhibit experts who perform their function more effectively. This is based on the fact that the
expert, in their most basic form, is a functional agent who achieves ends through certain means.
When another expert can achieve these ends in a way that the individual prefers, relations of
power mandate that the individual go to that new expert. But this is not solely restricted to
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experts within institutions. Indeed, if one is acting out of self-interest and believes that they
themselves can perform the function of the experts, and perform this more effectively, they too
are bound by relations of power to follow self-interest and act as an expert for themselves. We
see this in the secular sphere in many ways. The rejection of medical experts and the prominence
of self-diagnosing with WebMD is an example of this phenomenon. The rejection of climate
scientists’ warnings with a quick Google search that “proves” everything is fine is another. We
also see this, however, in the religious sphere, the primary example of this being the nones, who
see themselves as more effective mediators of the divine than the priests of institutional
religions.
And as we have seen, the status of religious expertise is in such disarray at the moment
that the nones can legitimately be seen as experts. While I did not argue this, I do believe that in
modern times the clergy have had to occupy the space of experts rather than authorities because
of their place in secular society. I also believe that much of the public now views clerical bodies
in terms of their expertise. I believe the emergence and growth of the nones, in part, proves all of
this to be true. And when authorities become experts, their power becomes unstable. With this in
mind, perhaps religious expertise accounts for the rising number of the nones after all. The
question I would now like to leave the reader with is whether this is good. Is it a positive thing
that religious authorities be demoted to experts? Is the distribution of this religious expertise to
the broader public something we should promote? And if this distribution is real, where does this
leave the study of religion? What has the study of religion missed by wrongly equating experts
with authorities? What can the study of religion gain by examining clerical bodies, and their
relationships with the laity, in terms of expertise?

107

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ammerman, Nancy. Sacred Stories, Spiritual Tribes: Finding Religion in Everyday Life. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Arendt, Hannah. Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought. New York:
Penguin Books, 1954.
Berger, Peter. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. New York:
Anchor Books, 1967.
Bryman, Alan. “Professionalism and the Clergy: A Research Note.” Review of Religious
Research 26, no. 3 (Mar. 1985): 253-60.
Burge, Ryan. The Nones: Where They Came From, Who They Are, and Where They Are Going.
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2021.
Bush, Stephen S. Visions of Religion: Experience, Meaning, and Power. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2014.
Campbell, Heidi A., and Paul Emerson Teusner. “Religious Authority in the Age of the
Internet.” In Virtual Lives: Christian Reflection, 59-68. Waco: Baylor University Press,
2011.
Casanova, Jose. Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1994.
Chaves, Mark. “Secularization as Declining Religious Authority.” Social Forces 72, no. 3 (Mar.
1994): 749-774.
Collins, H. M., and Robert Evans. Rethinking Expertise. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2007.
Dobbelaere, Karel. “The Meaning and Scope of Secularization.” In The Oxford Handbook of the
Sociology of Religion, edited by Peter B. Clarke, 599-615. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2009.
Drescher, Elizabeth. Choosing Our Religion: The Spiritual Lives of America’s Nones. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2016.
Durkheim, Emile. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Translated by Karen E. Fields. New
York: Free Press, 1995.

108

Epstein, Steven. “The Construction of Lay Expertise: AIDS Activism and the Forging of
Credibility in the Reform of Clinical Trials.” Science, Technology, & Human Values 20,
no. 4 (Autumn 1995): 408-437.
Eyal, Gil. “For a Sociology of Expertise: The Social Origins of the Autism Epidemic.” American
Journal of Sociology 118, no. 4 (January 2013): 863-907.
______. The Crisis of Expertise. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019.
Forrester, John. “Foucault, Power-Knowledge and the Individual.” Psychoanalysis & History 19,
no. 2 (August 2017): 215-231.
Foucault, Michel. “The Subject and Power.” Critical Inquiry 8, no. 4, (1982): 777–795.
Freidson, Eliot. Professional Powers: A Study of the Institutionalization of Formal Knowledge.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.
Gannon, Thomas M. “Priest/Minister: Profession or Non-Profession?” Review of Religious
Research 12, no. 2 (Winter 1971): 66-79.
Gregory, Brad S. The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society.
Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2012.
Hall, Richard H. "Professionalization and Bureaucratization." American Sociological Review 33
(1968): 92-103.
Hamilton, Malcolm. “Rational Choice Theory: A Critique.” In The Oxford Handbook of the
Sociology of Religion, edited by Peter B. Clarke, 116-33. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2009.
Hatch, Nathan O. The Democratization of American Christianity. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1989.
Heron, George. “‘None’: The Changing Religious Landscape in the United States.” Torch, Fall
2015, 17–24.
Hoffmann, John P. “Confidence in Religious Institutions and Secularization: Trends and
Implications.” Review of Religious Research 39, no. 4 (1998): 321-43.
Hofstadter, Richard, Anti-intellectualism in American Life. New York: Knopf, 1963.
Hoge, Dean R. “The Sociology of the Clergy.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of
Religion, edited by Peter B. Clarke, 581-96. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
James, William. The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature. New York:
The Modern Library, 2002.

109

Lettow, Susanne. “Turning the Turn: New Materialism, Historical Materialism and Critical
Theory.” Thesis Eleven 140, no. 1 (June 2017): 106-21.
Lim, Chaeyoon, Carol Ann MacGregor, and Robert D. Putnam. “Secular and Liminal:
Discovering Heterogeneity Among Religious Nones.” Journal for the Scientific Study of
Religion 49, no. 4 (December 2010): 596–618.
Lincoln, Bruce. Authority: Construction and Corrosion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1994.
McGuire, Meredith B. Lived Religion: Faith and Practice in Everyday Life. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008.
Mercadante, Linda A. Belief Without Borders: Inside the Minds of the Spiritual but not
Religious. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Nisbet, Robert. The Sociological Tradition. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993.
Rieff, Philip. The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith After Freud. New York: Harper &
Row, 1966.
Roof, Wade Clark. A Generation of Seekers: The Spiritual Journeys of the Baby Boom
Generation. San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1993.
________. Spiritual Marketplace: Baby Boomers and the Remaking of American Religion.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
Root, Andrew. Faith Formation in A Secular Age: Responding to the Church’s Obsession with
Youthfulness. Ada: Baker Academic, 2017.
Rouse, Joseph. “Power/Knowledge.” In The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, edited by Gary
Gutting, 92-114. Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Seligman, Adam B. Modernity’s Wager: Authority, the Self, and Transcendence. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2000.
Smith, James K. A. How (Not) To Be Secular: Reading Charles Taylor. Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 2014.
Stark, Rodney and William Sims Bainbridge. A Theory of Religion. New York: P. Lang, 1987.
Taylor, Charles. A Secular Age. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2007.
________. “What is Human Agency?” In Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers
1, 15-44. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
110

Teeuwen, Mark. “Japans Culture of Secrecy from a Comparative Perspective.” In The Culture of
Secrecy in Japanese Religion, edited by Bernard Scheid and Mark Teeuwen, 1-34.
London: Routledge, 2006.
Titon, Jeff Todd. Powerhouse for God: Speech, Chant, and Song in an Appalachian Baptist
Church. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1988.
Weber, Max. “Politics as a Vocation.” In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, edited and
translated by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, 77-128. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1946.
________. “The Social Psychology of the World Religions.” In From Max Weber: Essays in
Sociology, edited and translated by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, 267-301. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1946.
________. The Sociology of Religion. Translated by Ephraim Fischoff. Boston: Beacon Press,
1991.
Winch, Christopher. Dimensions of Expertise: A Conceptual Exploration of Vocational
Knowledge. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010.
Woodhead, Linda. “Intensified Religious Pluralism and De-Differentiation: The British
Example.” Society 53, no. 1 (February 2016): 41–46.
Wrong, Dennis. Power: Its Forms, Bases, and Uses. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers,
1997.

111

